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HIGHER SPEED LIMITS AND SAFETY:
THE CASE OF PRODUCE HAULERS
by
Richard Beilock
University of Florida

INTRODUCTION
Despite heightened concerns regarding motor carrier safety, in
the spring of 1987 the U.S. Congress enacted legislation permitting
states to increase speed limits to 65 miles per hour along most rural
portions of the Interstate System and, subsequently, along rural
portions of comparable roadways. It is generally recognized that
accidents tend to be more severe the higher the speeds of the
vehicles involved. Relative to automobiles, heavy trucks have larger
mass, longer stopping distance, and more limited maneuverability; in
addition, the probability of jackknifing increases at higher speeds. In
its recent report to Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment
found a strong positive relationship between posted speed limits and
fatal truck accidents. It concluded:
In view of the major role speed plays in fatal truck
accidents and the many characteristics of heavy
vehicles that make more difficult and time consuming
to stop safely, Congress may wish to reexamine the
decision to permit truck speeds of 65 mph at the
discretion of States and to explore other methods
of controlling excessive speeds for heavy vehicles.
(OTA, p. 105)
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Along with speed, driver fatigue is widely recognized as a major
safety hazard. Drivers are normally paid on a piece rate basis (i.e., by
the mile or load),1 and shipper/receivers or carriers normally set
schedule requirements. Therefore, drivers may have incentives to
drive longer and/or faster than is prudent or legal. In a study of 346
severe accidents involving motor carriers, U.S. D.O.T. found 27
percent due to excessive speed, 25 percent linked to driver fatigue
or dozing at the wheel, and a further 21 percent associated with
inattention, which could be a sign of fatigue. Moreover, 11 percent
of the drivers had falsified log books or were otherwise found to be
in violation of Hours of Service Regulations (HSR).2
A possible safety benefit from higher speed limits could be less
pressure on drivers to speed or drive for long periods. With higher
speed limits, a driver should be able to complete the same amount
of work as before in a shorter time without violating speed limits or
HSR. This advantage could be reduced or eliminated if schedules
were adjusted to require more work per unit time. For example,
Beilock and Capelle (1988) found that among general freight
haulers, the combination of schedule adjustments and the 65 mph
speed limit had resulted in very modest reductions in pressures to
speed or violate HSR.
In this paper, the effects of higher speed limits on the pressures
experienced by produce haulers to violate speed or HSR are exam
ined. These pressures are measured, in this study, in terms of the
relationship between the time allowed drivers to move from origin
to destination points and the amount of time necessary to legally
cover these distances. Schedules with smaller allowed time to
legally-necessary time ratios will be referred to as being "tighter.”
The exact methodology employed for measuring schedule tightness
is discussed in the next section. Produce haulers are of particular
interest because they are likely to be subjected to greater shipper/
receiver-induced pressures to deliver quickly than are those hauling
most other goods. Indeed, a comparison of produce haulers and
nonproduce haulers indicates that the former are much more likely
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to be on schedules which would force violations of speed limit or
HSR.3 This follows because produce is highly perishable and
because most of the buying activity on wholesale produce markets is
concentrated into a few hours each day. A late delivery to a market,
even by as little as an hour, can result in a much reduced price
received or force expensive refrigerated storage for a day (if avail
able) or both.
The specific objectives of this paper are to:
1. Develop and compare schedule tightness estimates for
long-distance produce haulers before and since passage
of legislation permitting 65 mph speed limits.
2. Examine the sensitivity of the results to assumptions
regarding previous driving times and average speeds
attainable with 65 miles per hour speed limits.
3. Assess whether or not there are significant differences in
schedule tightness by driver, carrier, or trip characteristics.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data for this study are drawn from two surveys of produce
haulers as they exited the Florida Peninsula. The first survey was
conducted for three, two-day sessions during the 1984/85 growing
season. One thousand three hundred and forty-six drivers were
interviewed.4 The second effort involved interviewing 1,762 drivers
over four, two-day sessions during the 1987/88 growing season.
The sites for both surveys were the Florida Agricultural Inspec
tion Stations located on U.S. 1-10, I-75, and I-95. All trucks passing
the stations are required to stop. These three sites account for 85 to
90 percent of all traffic and all other roadways have similar stations
(so avoidance is not an option). Refusal rates at each station were
low, averaging under 10 percent.5
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Drivers were asked a wide range of questions regarding their
current produce load, the trip which brought them to Florida, and
some demographic information. Interspersed among these were
questions regarding: pickup points, drop points, number of drivers,
and latest time the driver could arrive at the first drop without being
late.6 The answers to these questions, a record of the time and place
of the interview, and mileage estimates7 were used as inputs in
calculating schedule tightness. The spreading of these questions
across the interviews and the nonthreatening approach used for the
survey essentially eliminated the problem of response bias due to
self-protection motives. In over 3,000 interviews no respondent
ever indicated awareness that we were developing information to
estimate schedule tightness.
The tightness of a schedule may be gauged by either the amount
(or percent) of time over or under the legal limit necessary to drive
while obeying speed limits, or by the average speed necessary while
obeying HSR. For this study, the latter approach was adopted. The
estimated average speed necessary to maintain the schedule (as far
as the first destination subsequent to the interview) is denoted as
SCHSPD. Three basic assumptions were made:
1. The driver drove nonstop from central or southern Florida
to the interview sight. For 1984/85 this driving time was
assumed to be 4 hours. For 1987/88 driving time to the
interview sites were estimated according to distance
calculations. As a practical matter, the two approaches
were essentially identical.8
2. The driver was fully rested prior to the trip. (That is, there
were no driving or on-duty hours that would affect HSR
calculations.)3 *
3. All roadways in a state used by a trucker had speed limits
equivalent to the highest speed limit in that state.

4
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Except for stops for fuel and meals, the assumption that drivers
drove nonstop from the origin points to the interview sites is proba
bly true in virtually all instances. The interviews were conducted
each day from 6:00pm to 1:00am. It seems unlikely if many drivers
passing the inspection stations during these hours had slept between
picking up their loads and reaching North Florida. This would not
be true if the interviews had been conducted from 3:00am through
noon.
Assuming that drivers were fully rested prior to their current
journey is extremely conservative. As part of the analysis of the
1987/88 data, this assumption was relaxed. Also conservative is the
assumption that all roadways used to cross a state have speed limits
equal to the highest in the state. The assumption is particularly
unrealistic for speeds over 55 MPH, because such speeds are legal
only on eligible rural Interstates and comparable limited-access
highways. The effect of relaxing this assumption for states with
maximum speed limits over 55 MPH will also be explored.
To facilitate the pre/post 65 MPH comparison of schedules,
55-MPH-time-equivalent distances (DIST55) were calculated as
follows:
(1)
where:

DIST55
DIST
SPDMAX

=
=
=

DIST* (55/SPDM AX)
actual distance
maximum speed limit in state

In other words, DIST55 is the distance which could be traveled at
55 MPH in the same time as the actual distance could be crossed at
the prevailing maximum speed limit. For example, if the actual
distance to be traversed across a state was 300 miles and the
prevailing maximum speed limit in the state was 55 MPH, then the
actual (300 mile) distance would be employed in calculating sched
ule tightness. However, if the prevailing maximum speed limit was
60 MPH, then 275 miles (300 x 55/60 = 275) would be used in the
calculation, and 253.85 miles (300 x 55/65 = 253.85) would be
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FIGURE 1
MAXIMUM SPEED FOR TRUCKS ON RURAL INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS, 1987-1988

used if the maximum speed limit were 65 miles per hour. This
adjustment, is intended to eliminate or control for changes in speed
limits; i.e., to make SCHSPD estimates consistent regardless of the
speed limits in force. The maximum speed limits in force for trucks
in each of the 48 Continental U.S. States at the time of the 1987/88
survey are presented in Figure 1.
To accomplish objective 2, the analysis was repeated, using the
1987/88 data, with the following modifications:
1. To test sensitivity to previous driving time, schedule
tightness was successively recalculated with 1,2, 3, ...
and 8 hours of driving time added to the origin-tosurvey site portion of the movement
2. The analysis was also repeated with the following
maximum legally attainable speeds assumed:

Maximum legal
speed limit
60

Maximum legally
attainable speed
57.5

65

60
and

Maximum legal
speed limit
60
65

Maximum legally
attainable speed
55
55

For Objective 3, contingency table analysis or simple
correlations between schedule tightness measures, on the one hand,
and selected driver, carrier, and trip characteristics, on the other
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hand, was performed. While of interest, misleading results from
such univariate analyses is possible as an uncontrolled covariate(s)
may mask true relationships. Therefore, a multivariate approach was
desirable. To meet this need, the following regression was
estimated:
(2) SCHSPD =b0 + b/DIST2

+ b/RAT65 + b3*DRIVERS +

b4*EXPER

+ b5*AUTH + b6*PRIV +

b7 OWNOP

+ ba*VALUE + E

Where:
b0 ... 8

=

unknown parameters to be estimated

DIST2

=

actual distance from interview site to
the next destination.

RAT65

=

the proportion of DIST2 through states
with maximum speed limits above
55 MPH

DRIVERS

=

the number of drivers in the tractor

EXPER

=

the years of professional driving
experience of the individual driving
the truck at the time of the interview

AUTH

=

equals 1 if the firm owning the tractor
has an ICC authority, zero otherwise

PRIV

=

equals 1 if a private carrier, zero
otherwise

8

OWNOP

=

equals 1 if an owner-operator, zero
otherwise

VALUE

=

equals 1 if strawberries, tomatoes, or
ornamentals, zero otherwise

Journal of Transportation Management

The rationales for postulating that SCHSPD might be a function of
each of these variables are briefly discussed below.
HSR mandate periodic rests. If schedules do not fully account
for these stops, violation-inducing schedules will result (i.e.,
SCHSPD's will tend to be higher than are legally attainable). The
longer the distance, the longer the driving time necessary, and the
more legally required rest stops, ceteris paribus. Therefore, if stops
are not fully accounted for in schedules, schedules will tend to be
higher, the longer the distance (DIST2). By similar reasoning, if
schedules have not been fully adjusted to take advantage of higherthan-55 MPH speed limits, SCHSPD and the proportion of DIST2 with
higher speed limits (RAT65) should be inversely related.
Team driving allows one driver to rest without stopping the
vehicle. Therefore, it is expected that, on average, SCHSPD would
be lower for similar trips if team drivers are used (i.e., if DRIVERS is
greater than one).
EXPER is included on the premise that more experienced drivers
may differ from their less experienced colleagues regarding the
tightness of the schedules they are willing to accept or expected to
meet. There may also be differences in SCHSPD across carrier types
(OWNOP and PRIV, with for-hire fleets as the omitted category) and
between those holding and not holding Interstate Commerce
Commission Authorities. Reasons for such hypotheses include the
widespread perception among drivers that owner-operators are the
most likely to disregard speed and HSR (Beilock and Capelle, 1987),
and the Office of Technology Assessment's findings that ICC-exempt
carriers have higher violation rates and more serious safety problems
(OTA , p. 99).
Tomatoes, strawberries, and ornamentals are among the most
valuable and/or perishable crops hauled out of Florida. Freight rates
for higher valued commodities generally tend to be higher. DeVany
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and Saving suggest that this may be due to demands for expedited
service. If true, delivery schedules for these commodities would be
expected to be tighter, ceteris paribus, than for less valuable com
modities.

RESULTS
Pre and Post 65 MPH Scheduling
The results indicate that between 1984/85 and there has been a
marked easing of the schedules produce/ornamentals drivers operate
under. The average SCHSPD for 1984/85 was 50.5 MPH versus 40.9
MPH in 1987/88. This difference is easily significant at the .01 Level
of probability.
What percent of the drivers in each year had violation-inducing
schedules? The rule of thumb for the U.S. Department of Transpor
tation's Office of Motor Carrier Standards is that for trips over 10
hours duration (as was the case for virtually all in the samples) on
roadways with 55 MPH speed limits, average speeds over 45 MPH
are suspect (violation-suspect schedules) and over 50 MPH are
considered impossible without violating the speed limit or HSR or
both (violation-inducing schedules). By this rule, 44 percent of the
drivers in 1984/85 had violation-suspect schedules and 35 percent
had schedules which were clearly violation-inducing. The corre
sponding percentages in 1987/88 were 32 and 22 percent, respec
tively (Table 1). While the drop in clearly violation-inducing sched
ules from a over a third to less than a quarter is impressive, it should
be remembered that this is still a very high percentage and that
extremely conservative assumptions were used to develop the
estimates. The impacts of relaxing those assumptions are discussed
in the next subsection.

70
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The results also suggest that the easing of schedules is due in
large measure to higher speed limits, rather than to changes in
schedules. In Figure 2 the percentages of drivers whose schedules
required them to exceed speeds from 30 to 80 MPH (while obeying
HSR) are presented. A smaller percentage of the 1987/88 drivers
needed to exceed each speed level to stay on schedule than was
true for the 1984/85 drivers. However, if the 55 MPH National
Speed Limit had still been in force in 1987/88, the results for both
years would have been virtually identical over a wide range of
speeds (in Figure 2 and Table 1, compare 1984/85 and 1987/88unadjusted).

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES OF DRIVERS NEEDING TO EXCEED SELECTED
AVERAGE SPEEDS

Average Trip Speed
45 MPH

50 MPH

55 MPH

1984/85 drivers

44

35

1987/88 drivers

32

22

15

1987/88 drivers (1/2 adj)1

37

29

20

1987/88 drivers (unadjusted)2

43

34

28

Notes:

38

’Maximum attainable speeds with 60 MPH speed limits assumed to
be 57.5 MPH. For states with 65 MPH speed limits, maximum
attainable speeds of 60 MPH assumed.
2All states treated as though they had 55 MPH speed limits.
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FIGURE 2
SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS BEFORE AND AFTER 65 MPH SPEED LIMITS
Percent of Drivers Needing Higher
Speed to Meet Schedule

Speed Necessary To Meet Schedule (SCHSPD)
• 1984/85

■

1987/88

□ 1987/88 (unadjusted)

RELAXING ATTAINABLE SPEED AND PREVIOUS
DRIVING ASSUMPTIONS
The assumption that all roadways used have speed limits equal
to the highest in the state no doubt results in underestimates of
schedule tightness. This is likely to be particularly true for states with
speed limits exceeding 55 MPH, because such speed limits are only
applicable to rural portions of selected limited-access highways. It
may seem more reasonable, therefore, to discount a portion of the
speeds above 55 MPH. As discussed in the previous subsection,
without such discounting, the 1987/88 schedules appear to be much
looser than those in 1984/85, but with complete discounting (i.e.,
with no "credit” for supra-55 MPH speeds) the results for both years
are essentially identical (Figure 2 and Table 1).
Taking the middle ground of crediting half of the supra-55 MPH
speeds (equivalent to assuming that half the roadways used in a state
have supra-55 MPH speed limits) still results in significant improve
ments over 1984/85. While in 1984/85 the average SCHSPD was
50.5 MPH, the 1987/88 average would be 43.7 MPH and only 29
percent would have clearly violation-inducing schedules (Table 1).
Assuming the driver had not logged driving or on duty time prior
to the current produce haul is also extremely conservative. Earlier in
the day, many, if not most drivers spent several hours of driving or
on-duty time dropping off the previous load and repositioning for
one or several pickups. Driving during the days immediately preced
ing the produce haul would also have an impact if the driver is close
to the 60 hour limit (see footnote 2). However, there was not
sufficient time with each respondent to determine his/her recent
driving/on-duty history and, moreover, such inquiries would have
alerted drivers regarding our intent to determine legal and illegal
schedules.
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Schedule tightness is very sensitive to the amount of prior
driving time. Going from zero to 4 hours prior driving time, the
number of drivers with violation-suspect schedules (i.e., SCHSPD
over 45 MPH) increases by nearly a fifth from 32 to 38 percent of all
drivers, and the violation-inducing schedules (i.e., SCHSPD over 50
MPH) increases by nearly half from 22 to 31 percent of all drivers
(Table 2). With 8 hours prior driving, 44 percent of all drivers have
violation-suspect schedules and 35 percent have violation-inducing
schedules. Again, it was impossible to determine the actual number
of previous driving and on-duty hours for each driver. Therefore,
the conservative approach of assuming none was adopted. The
sensitivity of the results to this assumption suggests that considerably
more drivers actually have violation-suspect or violation-inducing
schedules than is indicated under the zero prior driving time as
sumption.

DIFFERENCES IN SCHSPD ACCORDING TO CARRIER,
DRIVER, AND TRIP CHARACTERISTICS
Identifying driver, carrier, and trip characteristics associated with
tight schedules would be of value to policymakers and industry
participants. In this subsection, the associations of selected charac
teristics with SCHSPD are examined via both univariate and multi
variate analyses.
Univariate Analysis
There are no indications of (statistically significant) differences
regarding schedule tightness across carrier types or between carriers
possessing and not possessing ICC Authorities (Table 3). These
results are consistent with the position that structural changes and
reduced economic regulations do not or only tangentially impact
upon attained safety Levels.

14

Journal of Transportation Management

TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (SCHSPD) AND THE NUMBER
OF HOURS ASSUMED DRIVERS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO
CURRENT TRIP

Hours of prior

Notes:

Percent of drivers with SCHSPD over
45 MPH1

50 MPH2

0

32

22

driving time

1

34

25

2

36

28

3

37

29

4

38

31

5

39

31

6

40

32

7

43

33

8

44

35

’Violation-suspect schedule.
Violation-inducing schedule.

Team drivers are only about a third as likely as single drivers to
have violation-suspect or violation-inducing schedules (Table 3).
This finding no doubt reflects understandable reticence on the part
of some carriers to employ a second driver. According to USDA
estimates (Buxton), variable costs for a fleet-owned produce truck
were 92 cents per mile in April 1989, of which fully 33 cents was
associated with the driver (pay, food allowance, etc.). Unless a
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second driver can significantly reduce transit time, it is clear that
team driving is extremely expensive. However, the dramatic
differences in schedule tightness suggest the importance of team
driving.
Consistent with DeVany and Saving's contention that higher
valued cargoes receive expedited service, the schedules are much
tighter for strawberry, ornamental, and tomato loads, on average,
than for other commodities (Table 3). This result may also explain,
at least in part, why higher valued produce and ornamentals tend to
command higher freight rates than do other commodities for similar
hauls.
Suggesting that legally mandated rest periods are not fully
accounted for in schedules, the distance to the first post-interview
destination is positively correlated with SCHSPD (Table 3). The
percent of that distance through states with speed limits over 55
MPH is negatively correlated with SCHSPD. This result suggests that
dispatchers have not fully adjusted schedules to take advantage of
higher speed limits.
Years of professional driving experience is negatively related to
SCHSPD (correlation significantly different from zero at the .05 level,
Table 3). This may reflect increased prudence with greater experi
ence. Alternatively, this result (and the others presented in this
subsection) may be an artifact of not controlling for other variables,
such as trip distance. For this reason I now turn to the multivariate
analysis.
Multivariate Analysis
Considering the exploratory nature of this work, the results of
the regression analysis are quite good. The equation is highly
significant, the signs and magnitudes of the parameter estimates are
consistent with expectations, and several are highly significant (Table
4). Only 10 percent of the variation in SCHSPD is explained by the

16

Journal of Transportation Management

TABLE 3
SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS AND SELECTED CARRIER,
DRIVER, AND TRIP CHARACTERISTICS

Drivers with SCHSPD over
45MPH
Percent
Chi sq.

Item
Carrier status:
For-hire fleet
Private carrier
Owner-operator

30
33
33

ICC Authority:
Yes
No

34
31

1.8

Drivers:
Single
Team

36
10

24
52.8***

High value cargo:1
Yes
No

40
30

2.8

13.1***

Item

50MPH
Percent
Chi sq.

21
27
21

3.8

24
21

1.9

9

24.3***

29
20

11.9***

Correlation with SCHSPD

Distance to first post
interview destination (DIST2)
Percentage of DIST2 through states with
speed limits above 55 MPH
Years of driving experience

.11***

-.11***
-.06***

Notes:
’High value cargoes considered to be strawberries, ornamentals,
and tomatoes.
*** statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level
*
statistically significant at the .10 level

TABLE 4
MULTIVATIATE ANALYSIS OF SCHEDULE TIGHTNESS

Dependent variable:

SCHSPD

Independent variables

Estimated parameters (standard error)

Intercept

59.44
(3.49)

DIST2

.0065***
(.0013)

RAT65

-.095***
(.023)

PRIV

1.20**
(.55)

OWNOP

.13
(1.34)

AUTH

3.20***
(1.24)

DRIVERS

-14.59***
(1.60)

EXPER

-.13***
(.048)

VALUE

5.59***
(1.33)

Equation statistics:
F Statistic
R2
Number of observations

Notes:

18.88***
.10
1,454

*** statistically significant at the .01 level
** statistically significant at the .05 level
*
statistically significant at the .10 level

equation. However, this is not surprising due to the limited informa
tion available. The inclusion of data on factors such as price levels
and trends for commodities at the various destinations,9 vehicle age
and condition, driver health and prior driving/on-duty history no
doubt would have improved the explanatory power of the equation.
The parameter estimates associated with DIST2 and RAT65 are
both easily significant at the .01 level and are, respectively, positive
and negative. This supports the results of the univariate analysis that
schedules tend to be tighter the longer the distance and looser the
greater the percentage of that distance over roadways with speed
limits in excess of 55 MPH.
The parameter estimate associated with PRIV is positive and
significant at the .05 level, indicating that private carriers tend to
maintain somewhat tighter schedules than for-hire fleets (incorpo
rated in the intercept). The parameter estimate associated with
OWNOP also is positive, but is not different from either for-hire fleets
of private carriers at any conventional level of probability.
Carriers possessing ICC Authorities appear to maintain tighter
schedules then those not possessing such authorities. The parameter
estimate associated with AUTH is significant at the .01 level and
indicates that drivers for carriers with ICC Authorities must average
3.2 MPH faster to stay on schedule than drivers for independent
carriers. This result flies in the face of the "common wisdom"
expounded by many in the trucking industry that carriers subject to
economic regulation are the more safety conscious. It should be
noted that the relationship between AUTH and SCHSPD was not
significant at conventional levels in the univariate analysis. Evidently
not controlling for the other covariates masked the relationship.
The relationship between SCHSPD and EXPER is also stronger
when controlling for the covariates (significant at the .01 level in the
multivariate analysis and at the .05 level in the univariate analysis).
The negative sign of the estimated parameter indicates that the more
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experienced the driver, the looser the schedule, ceteris paribus.
While the estimated relationship is highly significant in a statistical
sense, the magnitude of the parameter is small (.13). For a one MPH
reduction in SCHSPD based on experience, an individual would have
to have driven nearly additional 8 years.
The relationship between VALUE and SCHSPD is positive and
highly significant in both the univariate and the multivariate analyses.
The estimated parameter in the equation indicates that drivers
hauling tomatoes, strawberries, or ornamentals must average 5.59
MPH faster to stay on schedule than drivers hauling other commodi
ties.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is generally recognized that accident severity tends to increase
with speed. From a safety standpoint, therefore, the only benefit
from increased speeds would be reduced fatigue resulting from
shorter driving times per unit distance. This advantage, however,
could be dissipated if schedules were adjusted. The primary pur
pose of this study has been to determine the impact on the tightness
of the schedules maintained by produce/ornamentals haulers from
abandoning the 55 MPH National Speed Limit. This group of drivers
was of interest because they operate under unusually tight sched
ules, presumably due to the value and perishability of their cargos
(Beilock and Capelle 1987). The role of value in scheduling was
supported in this study by the finding that drivers hauling higher
valued perishables (i.e., tomatoes, strawberries, and ornamentals)
operate under much tighter schedules, on average, than do those
hauling lower-valued perishables.
In addition to tight schedules, produce/ornamentals haulers
frequently operate under fairly rigid schedules. This rigidity is
primarily the result of the manner in which much of the product is
marketed and distributed. Most produce is delivered to wholesale
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produce markets, chainstore warehouses, or individual supermar
kets. Each of these tend to operate in fairly set 24 hour cycles, with
produce/plant deliveries being desirable only for specific periods.
The large majority of transactions at wholesale produce markets
normally take place during a three to 3-4 hour period each day
(usually from 2:00 AM to 6:00 AM). Produce that is late may have
to be sold at a steep discount or stored overnight, if refrigerated
space is available. Chainstore warehouses normally do not hold
extensive inventories of perishable produce or plants. Rather, they
endeavor to coordinate deliveries as close to outshipment times as
possible. It is not uncommon for produce to be distributed to local
delivery vehicles directly from the incoming linehaul truck. Similarly,
individual stores have minimal storage capacities. Most produce and
plant deliveries are immediately used to replenish the display cases.
For all three of these facility types (i.e., wholesale produce markets,
chainstore warehouses, and individual stores) deliveries a few hours
early or late are highly undesirable. Unless a carrier can deliver a
full day earlier, often there is no advantage to altering schedules.
The rigidity of the schedules is believed by the author to be the
primary reason for the finding that scheduling demands on drivers
have eased as a result of the return to speed limits above 55 MPH.
The comparison of the 1984/85 and 1987/88 data indicated virtually
no changes in schedules. The higher speed limits in effect in 1987/
88 resulted, therefore, in reduced schedule tightness. It should be
stressed that the extent to which the salutary effects of eased
schedule tightness offset the negative effects increased accident
severity with higher speeds is entirely unknown.
Similar results may be expected for shipments of other types of
freight for which transportation demand conditions create rigidity in
delivery schedules. Conditions which suggest rigid delivery sched
ules include: deliveries directly to retailers and deliveries to receiv
ers having limited storage capacities and/or essentially immutable
sales or production schedules.
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Schedule tightness was found to increase with distance. This
suggests that schedules typically do not fully account for legallymandated rest periods. Another indication of this was the much
lower rate of violation-inducing schedules among team drivers than
among those operating solo. It may be prudent, therefore, for
enforcement efforts regarding compliance with Hours-of-Service
Regulations to focus on solo, long-distance drivers.
Perhaps the most surprising finding was that drivers for carriers
possessing ICC Authorities tend to have tighter schedules than those
who operate independently. A possible explanation for this result is
that possession of an ICC Authority is an indication of carrier sophisti
cation and organizational ability. If profit enhancement by optimiz
ing equipment and personnel usage is a carrier's primary goal, then
it would be expected that more sophisticated carriers would have
tighter schedules, ceteris paribus. Whatever the reason, combined
with the finding that there are only minor differences in schedule
tightness across carrier types, the study suggests that at least this
dimension of safety will not suffer as a result of economic deregula
tion.
Finally, while increased speed limits appear to have reduced
schedule tightness among produce/ornamentals haulers, the prob
lem is still severe. Employing extremely conservative assumptions, it
is estimated that nearly a third of the drivers had violation-suspect
schedules and over one in five had violation-inducing schedules.
Relaxation of those assumptions resulted in far higher estimates of
schedule tightness.

22

Journal of Transportation Management

FOOTNOTES
*This study was funded in part by the Market Facilities Branch,
Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agricul
ture.
11n a survey of 1,762 long distance drivers, 93 percent were paid
by the mile or load (Beilock, 1988).
2Hours of Service Regulations set legal limits to driving and onduty hours. The basic provisions are:
1. 10 Hour Rule: For every 10 hours of driving time there
must be at least 8 hours off-duty time.
2. 15 Hour On-Duty Rule: No person may drive after
having been on duty for 15 consecutive hours.
3. No person may drive for more than 60 hours in 7
consecutive days.
3Beilock and Capelle (1987) found that 27 percent of a sample
of nonproduce drivers had violation-inducing schedules versus 44
percent for produce haulers.
4The results of that study were presented in Beilock (1985).
5The high level of cooperation was due to several factors. The
agricultural inspection stations normally are nonthreatening to
truckers. Few citations are written and delays are normally slight.
The enumerators wore University of Florida identification and
introduced themselves as students. The questionnaires were brief,
drivers were not asked to identify themselves or their company, and
were assured of anonymity.
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6The latest time which the driver believes he/she can arrive at a
destination may differ from the actual requirements of the carrier or
receiver. Such differences may be due to miscommunication
between carrier and driver, the driver misjudging the leeway he/she
actually has, or the driver having personal reasons for wishing to
arrive earlier or later. However, for the purpose of gauging the
tightness of the schedule the truck actually operates under, the
driver's perception of the schedule, rather than that of the carrier or
the receiver, is relevant.
7The source for calculating mileages was Household Goods
Carrier's Bureau.
8The 1984/85 interviews took place during months in which
virtually all produce originated between 200 and 350 miles south of
the interview sites. However, nearly a third of the 1987/88 inter
views were conducted when production areas located within a few
miles of the interview sites were active. Therefore, while the 4 hour
driving time rule for 1984/85 was a reasonable (though somewhat
conservative) estimate, calculations based upon actual mileages were
important for 8.
It should be noted that detailed questioning regarding previous
driving and on-duty time was not undertaken both due to interview
time constraints and likely problems with response bias (i.e., eva
sion).
9Falling (rising) produce prices would encourage receivers to de
mand faster (slower) deliveries, ceteris paribus.
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS AFTER DEREGULATION:
NEW MOUNTAINS TO CLIMB!

by
Kenneth H. Forsythe, James C. Johnson, and
Kenneth C. Schneider
St. Cloud State University, Minnesota

INTRODUCTION
Transportation deregulation was started by the ICC and CAB in
the mid-1970s and this trend accelerated when it was championed
by President Jimmy Carter. Deregulation laws were enacted by
Congress in the airline industry (1977 and 1978), the trucking
industry (1980) and the rail industry (1980). We now have over a
decade of experience with transportation deregulation which has
substantially altered the transportation industry. Instead of govern
ment regulatory agencies establishing rates and services, these
competitive factors are now determined by marketplace forces. The
traffic management function has been drastically affected by the new
competitive environment found in the transportation industry. The
purpose of this article is to briefly review what traffic management
was like before and after deregulation. Then the results of a survey
involving 215 traffic managers will be examined. Specifically, traffic
managers were asked how deregulation impacted their position and
then they were asked to tell us, in their words, why they answered
as they did.
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT BEFORE DEREGULATION
Before deregulation, when the federal government was heavily
involved with day-to-day transportation issues, such as rates and
service offerings, the traffic management function was a Byzantine
world of gigantic tariffs — frequently a single tariff would be greater
than a thousand pages — and incredibly complex federal regulations.
Roy W. Mayeske worked for six years at Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing [3M] in purchasing and then — to his chagrin — was
transferred to the traffic department. He felt at the time that this
new position was the equivalent of being sent into exile to corporate
Siberia. Mayeske declared:
My career path had no plans for transportation.
If you look at transportation 15 years ago [1973),
it was highly regulated -- there were all kinds of
books with chapter and verse as to what you
could do and couldn't do. My initial reaction
was: Where did I goof and why am I getting
this punishment.1
Mayeske, who eventually came to like traffic management,
advanced at 3M to his current position of executive director of
transportation. Reflecting back on his initiation into transportation,
he noted that he was suspect by transportation managers both
within 3M and outside the company because he was not conversant
with the galaxy of regulatory details. At that time, traffic managers
were often thought to be highly specialized “technocrats" who
could fathom the inexplicable rules and regulations issued by the
ICC and CAB. Transportation executives were typically thought to
be unimaginative — dull - people, because the federal government
quashed almost every attempt at inspired solutions to distribution
problems. Therefore, the conventional wisdom was that innovative
people would not stay in transportation, because their initiative
would be constantly thwarted by federal regulations and rulings.2
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Mayeske observed:
In the regulated days it was almost a case that
the shipper or transportation person would say
to the rest of the company: "This aspect of the
business is very complicated -- you couldn't begin
to understand it, so you just come and ask me a
question and I'll tell you whether you can do it
or you can't do it."3

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AFTER DEREGULATION
Deregulation has drastically transformed the traffic management
function. Today, traffic managers can negotiate almost any aspect of
their relationship with carriers. Rates, service levels, and loss and
damage claims are examples of factors that can now be negotiated.
It is no exaggeration to say that if a traffic manager in 1974 was
accidentally hit on the head and went into a comma for the next 15
years, and then awoke in 1989 -- he or she would literally be
dumbfounded by the changes that had taken place. Bob Delaney, a
transportation management consultant with Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
captured the magnitude of the alterations brought about by deregu
lation, "Since deregulation, half of what I know is obsolete - the
problem is knowing from day to day which half that is."4
Because traffic managers have many more options available to
them now, their positions are becoming more complex. Richard G.
Velten, director of transportation for Johnson and Johnson Hospital
Services, noted that while some companies are decreasing their
traffic management personnel because of corporate downsizing —
which is also happening to every functional area — this should not
be interpreted to indicate that the traffic function is perceived by
senior managers to be of less importance. He observed:
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As far as the transportation professional's job
diminishing, I think just the opposite. I think it's
increasing. I think the transportation professional
can provide more value-added services to a
corporation than ever before because the capability
has increased so dramatically, especially since
deregulation.5
Roy Mayeske of 3M concurs with Velten. He stated, "Today we
have to understand the objectives of the business and how we fit in
enhancing it. You can't be a narrow specialist with tunnel vision
anymore — you've got to see the broader picture."6 James R. Eaton,
executive vice-president of Carolina Freight Carriers, believes that
deregulation, with its release of regulatory constraints that formerly
restricted imaginative solutions to distribution problems, has en
hanced the importance of the traffic management function. He
noted:
These people [traffic managers] now are more of
a decision maker in their company than they used
to be. When deregulation came upon us it put
them in almost the same situation as purchasing
agents. Purchasing agents in the old days had more
clout than the traffic group. But today the traffic
group has as much clout as the purchasing group
because they really are purchasing now and they
can get prices and tie in value ... They're more
marketing oriented than they were.7
It should be noted that because of the substantial changes in the
day-to-day operation of the traffic management position, some traffic
managers were not able to adjust to the new environment.
Mr. Mayeske noted, "There were some people who fell by the
wayside, couldn't cope, and left or moved into other aspects of the
business."8
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The above suggests that the traffic management function has
been substantially altered by deregulation. A survey was undertaken
to determine specifically in what ways deregulation has changed the
day-to-day activities of traffic managers.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A sample survey was conducted to identify traffic managers'
overall level of job satisfaction and related opinions. The sampling
frame consisted of all industrial companies represented in Value Line
Investment Survey. After eliminating all companies in various service
industries (e.g., air transport, banking, broadcast), an initial sample of
500 firms was selected at random from among the remaining
industrial concerns.
A questionnaire was then sent to the "Corporate/General Traffic
Manager" in each company along with a cover letter explaining the
nature of the study and requesting the respondent's cooperation.
Although the budget for the survey precluded any additional follow
up contact, a total of 215 traffic managers responded to the survey,
representing a response rate of 43 percent Given that there are an
estimated 1,200 industrial firms included in Value Line, a sample of
215 traffic managers offers a margin of error of no more than plus or
minus six percent at the 95 percent confidence level. Thus, all cited
percentages are correct to within, at worst, ±6.0 percentage points.
Indeed, as reported percentages depart from 50% in either direction,
the actual margin of error decreases, dramatically so for percentages
in the 20% or lower (80% or higher) range.
Exhibit 1 presents a graphical summary of these 215 traffic
managers and their companies. Reflecting the composition of firms
in Value Line Investment Survey, the companies represented in the
sample tended to be rather large. Indeed, from Exhibit 1, nearly
two-thirds (65.6%) of them have annual sales over $500 million, and
95.4% have annual sales over $100 million.
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EXHIBIT 1
RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

Percentage (times 100)

Despite the fact that the firms in the sample were mostly large
ones, the traffic managers themselves comprised a diverse group.
For example, the sizes of their staffs varied considerably. Just under
half (44.0%) of the managers had at least eight people reporting
while, at the other end, one in four (25.0%) managers had fewer
than three people reporting.
The traffic managers in the survey also differed by educational
background. While most of them (92.2%) had at least some college
background, just six in ten (61.8%) had college degrees or better,
and fewer than one in five (17.1 %) had a graduate degree.
Regarding age and experience, the majority (66.2%) of the traffic
managers were between 30 and 50 years old, and another 28.6%
were over 50. Very few (5.2%) were under 30. Similarly, almost
three-fourths (70.4%) of them had at least eleven years experience in
the transportation field, and half of those had over twenty years
experience.
Finally, while the profession is still predominantly male, it is
interesting that nearly ten percent (8.0%) of the traffic managers
surveyed were women.

DEREGULATION'S IMPACT ON TRAFFIC MANAGERS
Each respondent was asked, "Flas deregulation of transportation
made your job: much more challenging, more challenging, less
challenging or much less challenging." Almost half of the traffic
managers [46.9%] answered "much more challenging" and an even
higher percentage [47.5%] selected "more challenging." Finally,
5.6% of the traffic managers selected "less challenging." In addition,
each respondent was asked to elaborate, using his/her own words,
WHY they had selected the answer they did.
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Because almost 95% of the respondents found their positions
either much more challenging or more challenging, we have com
bined their comments. It was found upon analysis of these 203
comments, five general categories of answers emerged-from the
respondents' comments. These five general reasons accounted for
187 of the 203 statements. The remaining 16 comments were only
mentioned once or twice and are not included in the analysis. Each
of the five main factors that have rendered the traffic management
position more challenging will be discussed in the decreasing order
of frequency that they were mentioned. (Please note that in a few
cases it was difficult to categorize the respondent's answers because
their comments overlapped more than one point. In these cases,
the response was categorized by the factor which the respondent
seemed to be emphasizing.)

BECAUSE THERE ARE MORE OPTIONS AVAILABLE,
THE JOB IS NOW MORE COMPLEX
Fifty-six respondents |26.0%l noted that as a result of deregula
tion, there has been an influx of new carriers and there are addi
tional options available from existing carriers. The result is that there
are many new alternatives and variations available to traffic manag
ers compared to when the government tightly controlled the
transportation industry. Here is a sample of verbatim statements
from respondents explaining the new transportation environment.
* Deregulation has completely changed the game.
There is so much variety available that I'm only
limited by my imagination.
* Pricing of carrier services is more complex because
each carrier can tailor make a rate/service package
for us. Carrier bankruptcies have also further
complicated my life. Finally, price stability is a thing
of the past, which makes transportation cost fore
casting almost impossible.
34
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* There are so many more transportation companies
available compared to before deregulation. I could
spend every minute hunting and negotiating rates,
verifying their insurance and financial condition, etc.
I used to complain that the federal government held
this industry in a straight jacket, but as I look back at
it, at least it sure was an orderly situation compared
to the chaos of today.
* Many new options, many different rates, less federal
government rules and regulations means that there
are many new rules of the game. My job has
definitely become more complex as a result of
deregulation. However, please note that I'm not
complaining because like any other situation, I'm
progressing rapidly on the learning curve.
* The new options available to us -- new carriers and
the ability to negotiate rates and service levels - have
allowed the traffic function to become a significant
player in the corporate race to increase productivity.
Many of the new carriers require research on my part
to make sure that they will not fail and are capable of
providing the service levels they say they can. I really
enjoy the myriad of new options available to me. My
position is much more difficult than it used to be, but
also much more interesting. I really believe I can make
a difference compared to the old days when the real
challenge was to interpret government regulations.
* Today I have more options to select from in terms
of service availability, more vendors to select from,
and the ability to be involved with price and service
negotiations. These are all positive opportunities, but
there is also the potential problem of bigger screw-ups
because we are working with more carriers for which
we have less prior knowledge.
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• This industry is in a constant state of flux. At first I
found it exhilarating, today I wish it were a little
more predictable. Before deregulation this position
was too dull, today it is too exciting. I wish we
could find a happy middle-position.

TRAFFIC MANAGERS CAN BE INNOVATIVE AND CREATIVE
The second and third most commonly noted responses were
each noted by 52 respondents [24.2%]. One was that because of
deregulation, traffic managers now have the ability to be as innova
tive and creative as other functional areas in the company. Prior to
deregulation, the ICC and CAB basically controlled innovation and
these government agencies were inclined to move at glacial speeds
when it came to authorizing innovative rates and services. Today,
traffic managers have almost no restrictions in terms of finding the
most innovative and creative solutions to distribution problems.
Below are typical statements from respondents.
• The handcuffs have been removed! "If it is to be,
it's up to me." In other words, deregulation has
enabled transportation to become more involved
in the management process and our function can
become proactive in meeting corporate goals.
• It has allowed me to be more entrepreneurial in my
personal approach to solving problems. The other
side of the coin is that there is more risk for me to
make errors and have to live with the consequences.
• Transportation is now a purchased service and no
longer exists in a static environment. Today we can
structure a program with a carrier that really meets
my company's needs, as opposed to accepting what
the carrier has to offer. Creativity is limitless.

36

Journal of Transportation Management

* We now "purchase" transportation in a real
competitive environment -- not just "account"
for it as in the past.
* Rate and service levels are now an "open book."
A traffic manager today must be much more aware
of the constant changes and innovations that are
taking place in the transportation industry. I tend
to think I am a relatively creative person, but I must
confess I frequently talk to friends who have similar
positions to mine in different companies and I am
constantly amazed at some of the creative solutions
they have come up with. My traffic department is
slowly but surely losing the image that we are strictly
technicians who completely lack creativity.
* The transportation industry should have been part
of the free enterprise system a long time ago -- the
challenge now is to find the best for the least!
* I am now able to exercise control over my destiny
rather than be an interpreter of government regulations.

NEGOTIATION OF RATES AND SERVICES IS NOW
A MANDATORY SKILL
The ability to successfully negotiate rate and service packages
was also mentioned 52 times by respondents (24.2%). Traffic
managers in the first years after deregulation noted that while, this
skill was essential, they often found it frustrating to learn.9 Now,
however, respondents stated that they enjoy this new aspect of their
positions. Here are representative comments.
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* Deregulation has made negotiating a regular part
of my job. It has become very interesting to see
which carriers are willing to do their homework so
they can determine their cost structure and hence
how low their rates can go.
* I must do my homework when it comes to
negotiating and I have to have a better general
understanding of transportation costs and the
industry in general.
* The sky's the limit when negotiating with carriers
as far as rate structures and service and additional
contract terms, such as penalties for noncompliance,
rewards for superior service, etc.
* Deregulation has allowed freedom to negotiate
transportation service contracts that are specifically
designed to meet the exact needs of my company.
As I look back over the years, I wonder why this
didn't take place years ago!
* Deregulation has given us the opportunity to
negotiate rates with carriers, and I believe it has
made the carriers more responsive to shipper
needs. Transit times are much better now than
before deregulation.
* After deregulation in 1980, I have the ability to
deal directly with carriers on a one-to-one basis.
This makes my job more challenging as well
as more exciting.
* Negotiations are fun. Rates are now freely
negotiated where in the past they were "locked-in."
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS ARE LESS "TECHNOCRATS" AND
MORE LIKE OTHER MANAGERS
Sixteen traffic managers [7.4%] stated that what made their
positions more challenging was that with less governmental rules and
regulations, they were able to become less "technocrats" and more
like other managers in the company. Here are respondent quotes
expressing their pleasure at being liberated from excessive govern
mental rules and regulations.
* The free enterprise system can now be found
in transportation versus the old system of lethargy.
I no longer have the primary goal of complying with
all the governmental rules and regulations.
* Regulations no longer make everything "set," what
you now get out of the transportation system is up
to you.
* It has given me personal control and allowed the
rule books to gather dust. I feel the regulation era
was a wonderful time to learn about transportation
because it was such a protected environment. In
the old days I couldn't really make a mistake relative
to a competitor because they were subject to exactly
the same tariffs I was.
* I have the opportunity to negotiate various aspects
of the transportation contract in a business-like
manner instead of the old bureaucratic, uniform
procedure. My contribution to the success of my
company is the result of a real effort on my part
that would not have been possible before deregulation.
* My managerial talents are no longer infringed upon
by antiquated regulations.
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TRAFFIC MANAGERS MUST INVESTIGATE
CARRIER'S BACKGROUND
The last factor mentioned with some frequency was that
because of the tremendous influx of new -- often underfinanced —
carriers, many of them operate in precarious financial condition.
The problem is that if a carrier goes bankrupt when it possesses the
shipper's freight, a complete breakdown of customer service stan
dards takes place and the traffic department is castigated by the
firm's marketing department. To prevent this situation, the traffic
manager must become an amateur "Sherlock Holmes" in terms of
doing research to ensure that the carrier being utilized is not on the
brink of financial collapse. Here are typical statements from the
eleven traffic managers (5.1 %] that discussed this problem.
* Deregulation has brought about many new
opportunities to save my company money.
Also, deregulation has brought about the demise
of many carriers. I have to be much more
selective and careful about which carriers we
use in terms of financial stability, insurance
requirements, etc.
* There is so much price competition today that
we almost have too much of a good thing. I
really have to be careful when a carrier offers
me an outstanding package that they can stand
behind it and perform.
* Price competition is so severe that many previously
sound companies have failed in recent years. Also,
thousands of new companies have entered the TL
market While I enjoy the new options available,
I must conscientiously check each carrier's back
ground to make sure they won't go "belly-up"
with my freight frozen in their system.
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• Managing the efficient, timely and economical
movement involves much more than previously
during regulation. There are many more choices.
Price is the biggest issue, however, carrier financial
strength, which was never an issue with regulation,
is now an important part of the selection process.

THE CONTRARIAN'S POINT-OF-VIEW
Finally, it should be noted that twelve traffic managers [5.6%]
stated that in their judgment transportation deregulation had made
their positions “less challenging." Ironically, there is some logic to
what the respondents were saying. Here are illustrative statements.
• In recent years I have been recognized by senior
management for my ability to drastically decrease
transportation rates while also providing improved
ontime delivery schedules. What top management
doesn't know, and I'm not going to tell them, is
that I had next to nothing to do with these
improvements. The transportation market is now
so competitive that these changes took place
automatically and I was the benefactor.
• Carriers compete with themselves so vigorously
that rate negotiations are a breeze. This job is
easier today than ever before.
• It's easy to look good when the environment
is changing — which I can't control — and the
result is that what I'm judged on, rates and
service levels, are drastically improving. This job
is less demanding because carriers are competing
so aggressively for my tonnage.
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CONCLUSION
The traffic management function has been significantly - and
irrevocably — changed as a result of transportation deregulation.
Nineteen of every twenty traffic managers surveyed stated that
deregulation had made their positions either "much more challeng
ing" or "more challenging." They indicated that there were five
major factors (see Exhibit 2) that have substantially changed as a
result of deregulation, with the most common reason being that the
traffic management position is now much more complex because
there are so many more shipping options available. Finally, a few
traffic managers stated that deregulation had actually made their
positions easier, since they were credited for cost reductions and/or
improved service levels that resulted from deregulation.
Transportation deregulation, more than any other factor in the
history of traffic management, will be seen by future transportation
historians as the most important single event that liberated traffic
managers from being "technocrats." While technocrats are essential
managers, their skills are typically so narrowly focused that they are
perceived by senior management to be incapable of being promoted
to positions of greater responsibility requiring more generalized
management skills. Today's successful traffic manager must be a
generalist. To be effective, they must be analytical in their abilities to
study problems and implement creative solutions. This typically
involves negotiating with carriers so that "win-win" solutions are
created in which both the carrier and the shipper benefit from the
negotiated rate/service agreement. Traffic managers are now ideally
situated to be promoted to positions of increasing responsibility.
Why? Because they can clearly demonstrate to senior management
the improvements they have achieved regarding increased customer
service levels and/or freight rate reductions. These achievements
will propel them into positions of greater responsibility both in
logistics and marketing. We foresee the day when former traffic
managers regularly compete for top management positions.
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EXHIBIT 2
REASONS WHY TRAFFIC MANAGERS BELIEVE THEIR JOB IS MORE
CHALLENGING SINCE TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION

Job Is Now More Complex Because There
Are More Shipping Options

26.0%

Traffic Managers Can Now Be More
Innovative and Creative

24.2%

Negotiation of Rates and Services Is Now a
Mandatory Skill

24.2%

Traffic Managers Are Now Less "Technocrats
and More Like Other Managers
Traffic Managers Must Investigate Carrier's
Background
Miscellaneous Reasons

•Note: The percentages in this chart do not sum to 100%
because 5.6% of respondents stated that transportation
deregulation had made their job less challenging.

PERCENT

A precautionary note is advisable regarding the relatively few
traffic managers that stated that their positions had become easier
because of deregulation. They noted that deregulation had made
the entire transportation industry so much more competitive, that
they looked highly competent because service levels had substan
tially improved and rates had often drastically decreased. These
managers stated that these changes took place, not because they
were such effective traffic managers, but because the entire industry
was now so much more competitive. Therefore, they appeared very
efficient when, in fact, they were often not directly responsible for
the improvements. This situation is changing. In both the trucking
and air freight industries, rates have finally bottomed-out and in
many situations and are starting to slowly increase. Clifford Sayre,
director of logistics at DuPont Corporation, declared, "Demand has
caught up with supply of certain types of freight transportation and
rates are starting to move up" at a rate "close to or slightly more
than the inflation rate."10 Robert Delaney, a transportation consult
ant for Arthur D. Little, Inc., made a similar observation. "We've
gotten all the benefits of deregulation in freight-cost reductions.
Now we are starting to see real freight rate increases as carriers
replace equipment, pay higher fuel costs and pay more for labor.
You'll see carriers try to recoup some of the price cutting that
occurred previously."11 Therefore, traffic managers can no longer
expect market conditions to be as favorable as they have been
during the previous decade. Future improvements in service levels
and rates will be harder to come by and will require skillful analysis
and negotiation by traffic managers.
In conclusion, the traffic management function has been
irreversibly altered as a result of deregulation. Undoubtedly, traffic
managers were apprehensive about the myriad of changes brought
about by deregulation. They would have concurred with John
Adams, who in 1 776 [he became president in 1797] wrote to his
friend James Warren and stated, "All great changes are irksome to
the human mind, especially those which are attended with great
dangers and uncertain effects."12 Nevertheless, a decade after
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deregulation, traffic managers are not only coping with the new
transportation environment, but it appears they are revelling in their
new-found freedom from the straight-jacket of government rules and
regulations. Traffic managers are now managers in the true sense of
the word. Further they welcome this opportunity to prove them
selves. To borrow a literary metaphor, deregulation has presented
traffic managers with new mountains to climb. Based on the results
of this survey, traffic managers are apparently well past "base camp"
and, it would seem, very much enjoying this new set of challenges.
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STRATEGIC AIRLIFT: A CASUALTY OF DEREGULATION
by
Kent N. Gourdin
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

INTRODUCTION
In any society, logistics is the means for bridging the gap
between the national economy and a planned military operation.
However, in a democracy, logistics planning must compete with
other national objectives for an equitable distribution of that soci
ety's scarce resources. The share allocated to logistics must be
effectively utilized to create and sustain military forces in support of
National policies and objectives. Towards that goal, logistics is
comprised of four principal processes: requirements determination,
acquisition, distribution, and conservation. The suboptimization of
one of these components can adversely effect the entire logistics
function which would have severe consequences for the defense
effort as a whole. In other words, it makes little sense to procure
sophisticated equipment (acquisition), but lack the ability to expedi
tiously move it to the front lines (distribution).1
This paper will focus on the transportation component of the
distribution process, specifically addressing the contention that the
U.S. commercial aviation sector is no longer capable of fulfilling its
wartime mission. The implication is that, without a fully responsive
contingency distribution system, the logistics element would be
unable to support national defense objectives. Clearly, without
logistics a sustained war cannot be fought, let alone won. In a broad
sense, this article will examine the deteriorating linkage between
civilian wartime transportation providers and users (the Department
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of Defense). Specific areas to be addressed include military trans
portation, strategic airlift, and several peripheral concerns of impor
tance.

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
Transportation has historically been recognized as a critical
factor in the success (or failure) of military campaigns. During the
War of 1812, the United States incurred enormous costs associated
with transporting men and material, due to inadequate facilities and
transportation routes. In fact, the almost universal opinion at the
time was that those facilities could have been built for what it cost to
cope without them.2 Sokol notes that, once the situation has
become stabilized, the logistics problem, primarily one of transporta
tion, becomes of primary concern.3 Similarly, General Douglas
McArthur realized the importance of establishing and maintaining a
viable logistical chain, stating that tactics can be decisively influenced
by the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling
combat forces.4
Rather than investing in, and maintaining, transport resources
necessary only for war, the U.S. policy has been to rely on the
nation's commercial transportation industries to make their person
nel and equipment available to the DOD should the need arise. This
is in contrast to the Soviet Union, which maintains military airlift and
sealift assets beyond those required to meet peacetime needs. The
transport aircraft carry the livery of Aeroflot, the national airline,
while the ships fly the flag of the merchant marine, but they are, in
actuality, intended to satisfy contingency transport needs. In fact,
our government has repeatedly turned to the civilian sector for its
contingency transportation needs. Early in American history, the
military practice was to contract with civilians for the provision of
support functions such as transportation.5 With the outbreak of
World War I, the nation found itself with a private rail network
unable to meet wartime transport demands. In order to win that

48

Journal of Transportation Management

FIGURE 1. Air Transportation Policy Formulation & Implementation

conflict, the federal government took over the railroads in 1917 and
ran the system until 1920.6 This linkage between defense and
commercial transportation interests continues to exist today, and
forms the foundation for much of our total wartime movement
capability.
An important characteristic of this relationship is that the
government has exerted very little influence over the equipment
developed for, and operated by, transport companies. Rather, the
DOD "makes do" with planes, ships, and vehicles operated by firms
whose profit-driven needs may be significantly different from those
of defense planners. As an example, two mechanized air cargo
handling systems have evolved over the years, one developed by the
military and one by the civilian air carriers. The two are partially,
though not totally, compatible, a situation that could be extremely
limiting in a contingency. However, a larger and more serious
problem arises when the needs of the carriers no longer coincide
with those of national defense. For example, one of the initial
results of airline deregulation was that carriers began operating
smaller airplanes over shorter routes, often replacing larger aircraft
with these new fuel efficient aircraft. Unfortunately, these new
planes were of little use to the DOD, which still required large, longrange aircraft. We will return to this commonality question later.
The formal institutional relationship between national security
and air transportation goals is depicted in figure 1. Haefele notes
that it is national purpose--as articulated and expanded in national
goals--that determines the structure of supporting policies.7 Thus,
the various cabinet Secretaries are concerned with establishing
policies and objectives within their respective departments that will
contribute to the attainment of the overall national objectives as
specified by the President. However, the specification of national
security goals also influences the development of transportation
goals insofar as the nation's transport is expected to support the
DOD. This may be, unfortunately, a one-way street While national
transportation policy includes a commitment to meet the needs of
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national defense, defense policy is often developed with little regard
for the availability of adequate transport resources. The result is that
the transportation system must often react to, rather than evolve
with, DOD policy since it is not until national transportation policy is
implemented that the specific needs of one sector relative to the
other are actively considered. The intended objective should be to
utilize the nation's transportation resources so as to meet the needs
of both. However, the actual results may be quite different, as the
following example will readily illustrate.
Design on the Army's new Ml tank was begun in 1973. The full
production run called for 7,058 vehicles to be manufactured at a
unit cost of $2.68 million. It was not until mid-1981 that the Army
rigorously addressed the transport problems inherent in the move
ment of the 60 ton behemoth. The Pentagon noted that a standard
rail car could only handle one Ml, so the proposed solution was to
build 569 stronger, more expensive flatcars that could accommodate
2 tanks each.8 Similarly, air transportation is constrained in that the
C5 wide-body airlifter can only carry one vehicle, effectively limiting
the weapon's usefulness as a part of a short-notice deployment

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
The entire concept of strategic airlift (i.e. between the United
States and overseas areas) was formulated with the start of World
War II.9 Since the military had little long-range air transport experi
ence, the domestic airline community was pressed into service to fill
the void. Though operating under the auspices of the Army's Air
Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service, the
carriers used their own equipment, facilities, and personnel to
provide the capability for long-haul, rapid movement of men and
equipment so desperately needed. In essence, the airlines them
selves built and operated the wartime strategic airlift organizations.
Following the war, the Air Force's Military Air Transport Service
(MATS) became the permanent strategic air movement arm of the
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United States military establishment. In 1965, MATS became the
Military Airlift Command (MAC), which continues to perform as the
single DOD manager for airlift. Strategic air movement is provided
with an organic fleet of 96 C-5 wide-body aircraft, and 267 narrowbody C141 s.10
To augment this capability in time of war or national emergency,
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program was created in 1951,
whereby civilian air carrier aircraft were identified by tail number
and allocated for national defense at three levels of need which will
be explained in detail later.11 There was, and still is, no legislative
basis for the CRAF; its success depends upon the cooperation of the
airline industry.12 To foster that spirit of voluntary participation, as
well as to familiarize civil carriers with the handling of military
passengers and cargo, MAC awards yearly contracts to CRAF partici
pants for the provision of international air services. For Fiscal Year
(FY) 89, $310 million worth of airlift will be provided for MAC by
commercial carriers,13 The CRAF as of August 1989 is depicted in
Table 1. (It is worth noting that the exact size and composition of
the CRAF fluctuates from month to month as carriers add and drop
aircraft due to maintenance, sales, or equipment acquisitions.) By
far the largest and most important portion of the CRAF is the LongRange International Segment, consisting of 400 aircraft. This is the
element that supports MAC strategic operations, and necessitates the
use of aircraft capable of extended overwater operations with a
productive payload.
Participation in the CRAF involves a commitment on the part of
the carriers to respond to varying emergency situations incremen
tally, based on three levels of urgency. Stage I may be employed by
the Commander-In-Chief of MAC (CINCMAC) to maintain cargo and
passenger backlogs at MAC air bases within acceptable limits.
Carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft available for missions.
- Stage II includes those airplanes in Stage I, and is for expanded airlift,
approved for use by the Secretary of Defense in providing capability
for a contingency not warranting a declaration of national emer-
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TABLE 1
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF)

Aircraft Allocated A$ of August 1989
Domestic Segment (39)
B727
DC-9
L-188
L-100

8
3
11
17

Alaskan Segment (7)
L-100
L-188
DC-6

3

2
2

Short-Range International Segment (30)
B-737
B-727
B-757

4
21

5

Long-Range International Segment (400)
DC-8/B-707
B-747
DC-10
L-1011
B-767/A310

Passenger (271)
20
109
57
38
47

+
+
+
-1+

Cargo (129)
51
52
26
0
0

71
161
83
38
47

(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
Capability Summary, 1 August 89
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TABLE 2
CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
As of August 1989
Domestic Segment
Evergreen International
Southern Air Transoport
TPI International
Zantop
Alaskan Segment
Markair
Northern Air Cargo
Reeve
Short-Range International Segment
Aloha
Eastern
Transocean
Joint Venture 1: Key/American Trans Air
Long-Range International Segment
American
Continental
Delta
Hawaiian
Northwest*
Joint Venture 1:
Flying Tiger*
Tower
UPS*
United
Joint Venture 3:
Northwest*
Federal Express
Joint Venture 5:
Pan American
American
Connie Kalitta*

Pan American
Southern Air Transport*
TWA
United*
Joint Venture 2:
World
Rosenbalm*
American
Evergreen*
Emery*
Joint Venture 4:
Pan American
Evergreen*
Tower
Joint Venture 6:
Pan American*
American Trans Air
Connie Kalitta*

Joint Venture 7:
Rosenbalm*
CF Air Freight*
•Airlines providing cargo aircraft
(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Capability
Summary, 1 August 89

gency. As in Stage I, carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft avail
able. Stage III may be implemented by the Secretary of Defense,
only after a national emergency is declared by the President or
Congress. Carriers have 48 hours to respond to his call, which
results in the commitment of all long-range cargo aircraft Even
though Stage III utilizes all CRAF line-haul resources, it is still not
sufficient to meet wartime air cargo requirements, a shortcoming
that will be discussed in more detail later.14 Carriers participating in
the CRAF as of August 1989 are shown in Table 2.
Presently, the U.S. wartime airlift requirement for military cargo
is 66 million ton miles (MTM)/day, a figure that takes account of our
sealift capability and - the prepositioning of equipment at various
overseas locations. MAC organic aircraft (C-141/C-5) will provide
32.7 MTM/day capability, while the KC-10 (an aerial tanker/transport
based on the commercial DC-10) will generate an additional 4.5
MTM/day of military airlift15 A Stage III CRAF activation would result
in approximately 16 MTM/day capability, based on the CRAF compo
sition in August 1989.16 Thus, out of the 66 million ton miles/day
that must be moved in wartime, the U.S. can, at best, hope to
support only 53 million ton miles/day in the foreseeable future,
leaving a 13 million ton miles/day shortfall.
The shortage of required airlift was discussed earlier. Of critical
importance is the fact that this shortfall is exacerbated by a CRAF
now subject to the vagaries of the free market Deregulation of the
airline industry led to a dramatic increase in air carrier competition.
Coincidentally, costs (particularly for fuel) were rising while the
nation's economy faltered and fewer people travelled by air. The
airlines moved to adopt hub-and-spoke systems serviced by smaller
aircraft; carriers like Pan Am, United, and American abandoned all
cargo service and sold off their freighter aircraft; new carriers
entered the industry, squeezing profits still further and, in some
cases, failing quickly. Complicating the situation for our interna
tional airlines was the fact that, while we had deregulated our
commercial air industry, the rest of the world had not. Thus, U.S.
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airlines faced the added burden of having to compete with overseas
carriers owned or largely controlled by their respective governments,
and, in many cases, operated for reasons other than profit. The
result was a decade of upheaval in the air carrier industry that
directly impacted the Long-Range International segment of the CRAF
as well. The smaller airplanes being adopted by the carriers were
not suitable for long-haul overwater transportation, and, in fact,
were replacing older aircraft that could fulfill that mission. Braniff
International went bankrupt in 1981; Flying Tigers came perilously
close to following suit in 1986; and Pan American, after losing $72.7
million in 1988 (its 11 th moneylosing year out of the past 1 7),17 is
now actively seeking some sort of merger partner.18
The 1980's saw other developments of importance to the CRAF.
In 1983 the Air Force implemented the CRAF Enhancement Program
whereby convertibility features could be retrofitted (at government
expense) to existing passenger airplanes that would allow them to
transport military cargo in time of war. Of the 19 B747s committed
to the program, 15 have been modified as of late 1988.19 Another
DOD effort to address the declining number of long-range airliners in
the CRAF took the form of a joint venture (JV) Program initiated by
MAC in 1986. The intent of the program was to bolster the CRAF by
bringing in operators and/or carriers previously excluded from par
ticipating. Should the need arise, aircraft and crews from the joint
venture firms would be pooled and utilized as though they were
being supplied by a single entity.20 This enabled MAC to utilize the
significant cargo fleets of companies such as UPS and Emery, some
thing it had not been able to do before. Finally, growing concern
about the increasing age of the airliner fleet led foreign and domestic
carriers to embark on an unprecedented aircraft buying spree.
Boeing received orders for 636 aircraft valued at $30.1 billion in
1988,21 while McDonnell-Douglas logged $15.6 billion infirm
backlogs for the year.22 Of importance to this discussion is the fact
that included in those figures were firm orders for 1 72 B747-40023
and 103 MD-11 wide-body transports.24
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However, whether or not the CRAF will benefit by these devel
opments is uncertain. While the CRAF Enhancement Program
resulted in the addition of valuable wartime cargo-carrying capabil
ity, Pan Am was the only carrier willing to participate. Thus, there is
no ongoing stream of existing aircraft being modified; in fact, the
B747 lost over Scotland in December of 1988 was a CRAF enhanced
plane. The airline was contemplating putting twelve more aircraft
through the program, but the revenue capacity eliminated as a result
of the accident may necessitate postponement of that decision.25
Another area of concern centers around the wartime management
of the CRAF and its various component parts. A full-scale activation
would involve coordinating the efforts of 29 airlines and eight joint
ventures. Of the seven long-range international segment joint
ventures shown earlier in Table 2, three are made up of three
carriers each, while two more are comprised of four and five carriers
respectively. Notification procedures alone would to be daunting;
while the task of providing ongoing leadership in a contingency
environment would appear to be virtually impossible. Finally, the
growth in wide-body aircraft orders is a mixed blessing. For the first
time in over a decade, U.S. airlines are committing to wide-body
long range jets in appreciable numbers. American Airlines, for
instance, recently ordered eight MD-11s and optioned 42 more,26
while Delta ordered nine and optioned 31,27 But these are all
passenger versions that will provide no cargo carrying capability even
if they do eventually find their way into the CRAF. Furthermore, tax
law changes have combined with airline consolidations and mercu
rial market conditions to force a shift in transport aircraft purchasing
and ownership patterns. Carriers are finding short-term leases (i.e. 5
years) an increasingly attractive alternative to ownership.28 In fact,
30% of the U.S. commercial fleet is now leased, and that figure
could increase to 60-70% in the next decade.29 This gives the
airlines tremendous flexibility to change aircraft types in response to
competition and market opportunities, and eliminates the large
capital costs associated with purchasing their own aircraft. However,
one of the largest leasing companies in the world is CPA Group Ltd,
which is an Irish firm.30 This raises the specter of a further decline in
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the CRAF, since foreign-owned aircraft are excluded from participat
ing. In addition, the flexibility inherent in the leasing option will
work against the fleet stability so essential to the CRAF. Programs like
CRAF Enhancement are predicated upon maintaining the modified
aircraft in the U.S. fleet for considerably longer than five years.
The preceding discussion has served to illustrate a crucial fact:
the needs of the airlines no longer parallel those of national defense.
This is not, necessarily bad. However, there is no mechanism in
place to insure the maintenance of that industry/government linkage
forged during, and after, World War II. Indeed, we can't even
“draft” the carriers as we did then because their
smaller aircraft makes that proposition of limited
that missing link that is the crux of the problem.
lation Act of 1978 makes essentially no mention

emphasis on
value. Thus, it is
The Airline Deregu
of national defense,

retaining the position underlying previous aviation legislation that a
sound commercial air transport system would insure an adequate
reserve of airlift capability in the event of war. Thus, it would be
inaccurate to say that deregulation, in and of itself, placed the CRAF
in jeopardy. Rather, the move away from economic regulation
graphically illustrated that airline interests and defense transport
interests may not, for whatever reason, coincide. The implication is,
then, that in the absence of some mechanism to insure defense
transport needs are met, managerial responses to future environ
mental developments (advanced aircraft technology, noise and
pollution concerns, further market changes) could prove just as
detrimental to wartime airlift capability as deregulation has today.
Unfortunately, policy makers have not handled this divergence
very well. The perception is that the best way for the government to
foster support for the CRAF is within the confines of the free market,
as opposed to some sorts of more direct action that will delineated
later. Thus, after ten years of trying to negotiate the CRAF Enhance
ment Program, the end result was the large-scale participation of
only one carrier. Similarly, the almost inescapable conclusion is that
the Joint Venture program would, if implemented, prove to be an
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administrative and logistical nightmare. Finally, after almost four
decades, airline participation in the CRAF is still voluntary. In sum,
MAC and the DOD seem content to react to environmental changes
after they occur, rather than pushing for a more proactive approach
that does not rely solely on the vagaries of the free market

PERIPHERAL ISSUES
It is important to realize that the use of civil air transport re
sources for military purposes is, at best, a compromise. The C141
and the C5 were specifically designed to carry cargo and are charac
terized by a high wing design; that is, the fuselage is suspended from
the wing. This places the cargo compartment close to the ground,
and provides the drive on/drive off capability so essential to the mass
movement of wheeled equipment. The civilian air cargo industry on
the other hand uses aircraft that are derivatives of passenger planes.
The B747, the DC10, the B707 and the DC8 were not designed for
freight transportation. They have a low wing design which places
the fuselage above the wing, effectively eliminating any possibility for
drive on/drive off vehicle handling. In addition, the two systems
each utilize cargo pallets that are fundamentally different in design.
Those used by the military measure 88 inches by 108 inches, while
civilian pallets are either 88 or 96 inches by 125 inches.
Shipping military cargo aboard civil airliners presents some
unique problems, even in peacetime. Military aircraft and materials
handling equipment (MHE) are designed to handle DOD pallets
widthwise (i.e. the long edge is perpendicular to the aircraft's line of
flight). Narrow body airliners, as well as the DC10, are loaded from
the side, which means the pallets must first be placed into the CRAF
airplane, then manually spun 90 degrees before they are pushed
down the fuselage. On those B747s designed for loading through
the nose, the pallets must enter the aircraft lengthwise (i.e. the long
edge parallel to the line of flight). Hence, they all must be turned 90
degrees before they are put onto the loader. When this is done,
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military loading vehicles can carry only four pallets versus the five for
which they are designed. It is worth noting here that, while military
pallets can be transported on civilian airplanes, commercial pallets
and containers are virtually unusable on military aircraft. The rail
and locking systems aboard civilian aircraft can be adjusted to
accommodate both types of pallets, while military planes can only
accept Air Force pallets. Unfortunately, when airliners are used to
transport military cargo, suboptimal aircraft utilization can result
from the smaller size and reduced load bearing strength of DOD
pallets relative to airline pallets
Another problem is that extremely large pieces of cargo,
particularly rolling stock, are very difficult to handle via civilian
aircraft. When utilizing sideloading planes, they payload has to be
small enough and/or maneuverable enough to make the 90 degree
turn from the loader into the fuselage. In addition, the narrow cabin
of the DC8 or the B707 effectively limits the size and shape of the
shipment, as does the nose opening in the wide body. Finally, the
lack of a drive-in/drive-off capability proves to be a very limiting
factor, especially in the context of a wartime scenario. Of equal
concern is that military and civil loaders are basically restricted to
servicing their respective aircraft. That is, Air Force loading vehicles
were designed to handle aircraft having a cargo floor essentially at
truckbed height above the ground. While this equipment can also
service narrow-body airliners, it, cannot interface directly with widebody Freighters. An elevator of commercial design must be utilized
as a bridge between the aircraft and the loader; the plane simply
cannot be worked without it. Similarly, civilian loading equipment is
intended for use on aircraft having a cargo compartment that is ten
to fifteen feet above the ground. The cab is generally designed to fit
under the fuselage, something the low-slung military transport
aircraft does not allow.
The inescapable conclusion is that military and civilian cargo
handling systems are fundamentally incompatible. The two function
together in peacetime because there is sufficient time to overcome
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the constraints delineated earlier. But in a contingency situation
those limitations could prove crippling. Essentially, military pallets
and materials handling resources will be tasked to fulfill all wartime
requirements because of the incompatibilities previously mentioned.
Limitations on the type and size of cargo that can be moved aboard
civilian aircraft would necessitate a horrendous scheduling effort
intended to insure that aircraft and cargo are matched correctly.
The commercial elevator required for wide-body loading/unloading
is an obvious weakness since those aircraft cannot be serviced
without it Although MAC has prepositioned 116 of these elevators
throughout the airlift system,31 there is no guarantee that commercial
cargo missions will be, or can be, limited to those fields having an
elevator on station. Finally, the lack of a drive-on/drive-off capability
severely limits the effectiveness of civil airliners in a contingency
situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS
It is absolutely imperative that the nation's air transport re
sources become more responsive to the needs of national defense.
One long range solution to the airlift problem would be for both
MAC and the airlines to fly the same type of airplanes in the future.
This could lower the per plane cost to each group, and would
provide for a common cargo handling system while insuring a steady
growth in usable CRAF capability. Of course, the introduction of the
new C-17 widebody military transport (like the C-141 and C-5, also
a high-wing design) in the mid 1990s will go a long way towards
eliminating the airlift shortfall discussed earlier. But it will do
nothing to address the deteriorating condition of the CRAF. Similarly,
MAC has been working for years to put together a NATO "CRAF"
comprised of suitable aircraft from nations belonging to that alliance,
with little success. In truth, such a show of unity from countries of
widely, disparate cultures and ideologies seems doubtful. Another,
more immediate, alternative may be to capitalize on the renewed
interest being shown by US airlines in wide-body planes, and CRAF

,
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enhance all long range passenger aircraft before they come off the
assembly line. This would keep modification costs down, and would
provide a flow of contingency capability into the civil fleet Admit
tedly, the carriers might have some reservations about the effect of
the increased weight on aircraft's productive range, but the impact
of this could perhaps be minimized through some sort of abbrevi
ated enhancement package that would limit the wartime cargo
payload slightly in exchange for reduced structural strengthening.
From the standpoint of military airlift alone, the first solution
delineated above is the preferred one since it dramatically increases
not only capacity, but much needed drive-on/drive-off capability.
Unfortunately, the cost of this option is tremendous, and it does little
to address the ongoing health of the CRAF. Rather, the third alterna
tive seems the smarter choice. By enhancing new civil aircraft,
increased contingency airlift can be obtained at a reasonable perplane cost. While these airplanes could not provide drive-on/driveoff flexibility of their military counterparts, perhaps bulky vehicles
and other large cargo could be earmarked for MAC. Alternatively,
funds could be spent to develop loading equipment that would
allow roll-on/roll-off loading and unloading of civil aircraft At any
rate, a continuous CRAF enhancement program sensitive to the
revenue needs of the carriers, seems to offer the most promise for
sustained CRAF growth.

CONCLUSIONS
Prior to 1978, the moods of the DOD tended to coincide nicely
with those of the airlines. The latter wanted bigger, faster, longerrange aircraft, which was exactly what the former desired. The
airlines could afford to buy those aircraft and were, by and large,
perfectly willing to commit them to the CRAF. But while their
collective enthusiasm for the CRAF remains just as strong today, the
realities of the free market have made them less able to participate.
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MAC approached one large US carrier several years ago, requesting
that several new B747s be CRAF enhanced while still on the assem
bly line. The airline declined, citing range/payload penalties result
ing from the weight of the modifications that would have rendered
them less competitive over their long-haul routes. To put it bluntly,
we simply do not have the means to rapidly transport the men and
equipment needed to support DOD contingency plans. This, in turn,
places the entire logistics effort at risk, a situation with grave implica
tions for the nation's defense posture. Recall that the purpose of
logistics is to create and sustain military forces to support national
policy and objectives. Unless the relationship between the industrial
providers and government users of air transportation is redefined to
reflect the changing needs of both, America's strategic airlift capabil
ity will become a casualty of deregulation. The loss of such an
important national resource must not be allowed to happen.
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"AN INSIDE LOOK AT DELTA NU ALPHA MEMBERSHIP"
by
Roger E. Jerman and Ronald D. Anderson
Indiana University School of Business

INTRODUCTION
Delta Nu Alpha is one of the largest fraternities for persons in
the traffic, transportation, and logistics industry. Delta Nu Alpha was
founded in 1940 to facilitate and promote greater knowledge of
traffic and transportation, to develop an appreciation of the traffic
profession as a motivating factor in industry and commerce, and to
encourage young persons of ability to enter and remain in the field
as a life's work.
The purpose of this report is to provide demographics, statistical
characteristics, and professional viewpoints of the 1988 membership
of Delta Nu Alpha. Specifically, the objectives are to:
1. Summarize professional characteristics and develop
comparisons with a similar 1976 study,
2. Summarize salary levels by management position and
level of decision-making responsibility,
3. Analyze the impact of deregulation on perceptions
of stress and prestige,
4. Summarize the preferences for decentralized
salesmarketing functions, centralized shipper trafficdistribution functions, and national accounts selling,
5. Develop profiles of decision making styles.
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METHODOLOGY
In late Spring of 1988, 3,500 mail questionnaires were sent to a
systematic sample drawn from a list of approximately 9,000 mem
bers of Delta Nu Alpha. This resulted in 920 usable returns or a
response rate of 26.3 percent. The survey was, in part, a replication
of a 1976 survey which was the basis for a previously published
report on Delta Nu Alpha.1 A single mailing of 2,000 questionnaires
in 1976 to the then approximately 11,000 members of Delta Nu
Alpha resulted in 664 usable returns for a response rate of 33.2
percent

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
The mixture of carriers and shippers has remained relatively
constant from 1976 to 1988, as shown in Table 1. However, the
relative number of rail carriers has decreased four percent while
motor carriers have grown eight percent. Manufacturing oriented
shippers remain the overwhelming majority of shipper membership
and grew by two percent Whereas, wholesaling oriented shipper
grew by four percent, and retail oriented shippers lost one percent
over the time period.
The most pronounced changes in the profiles from 1976 to
1988 are shown by Table 2, which portrays changes in age, educa
tion, and growth in female membership. The 1988 membership is
significantly better educated than the 1976 membership. Further,
approximately sixty-two percent of the 1988 respondents are under
age forty-five, compared to fifty percent of the 1976 respondents
under age forty-five. This implies that the major educational pro
grams of Delta Nu Alpha can be geared to an increasingly sophisti
cated audience. This also suggests that the organization is not
plagued with an “aging fleet", and offers strong leadership potential
for younger members.
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TABLE 1
BUSINESS COM POSTION: 1976 vs 1988

Carrier mode

1976

1988

Change

Motor
Rail
Other
N

75%
16%
9%
314

83%
12%
5%
433

8%
-4%
-4%

Business type

1976

1988

Change

Carrier
Shipper
Other
N

48%
43%
9%
664

47%
43%
10%
920

-1%
0%
1%

Shipper business

1976

1988

Change

Manufacturing
Wholesaling
Retailing
Other
N

76%
7%
7%
10%
282

78%
11%
6%
5%
388

2%
4%
-1%
-5%
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TABLE 2
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS: 1976 vs 1988

Age

1976

1988

Under 35
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-Up
N

26%
24%
33%
16%
1%
649

22%
40%
24%
13%
1%
811

Education

1976

1988

Change

High School
Some College
College Graduate
Some Graduate Work
Graduate Degree
N

12%
47%
24%
10%
7%
662

8%
41%
32%
13%
6%
782

-4%
-6%
8%
3%
-1%

Sex

1976

1988

Change

Male
Female
N

96%
4%
654

75%
25%
782

70

Change
-4%
16%
-9%
-3%
0%

-21%
21%
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The most significant demographic change was the astounding
growth of women membership. In 1976, there were hardly enough
responding female members to count In 1988, twenty-five percent
of the responding members were female. This is a whopping
twenty-one percent growth. Delta Nu Alpha is to be commended
for its successful recruitment of women members and also for getting
them involved at the officer level. The future Delta Nu Alpha
member will most likely come from the ranks of the college gradu
ate. Since the present undergraduate School of Business programs
have over fifty percent women enrollment, Delta Nu Alpha seems to
be on the right strategic track for long term growth in recruiting the
female segment for membership.
Transportation and distribution executives have long suffered
from somewhat of an identity crisis. Part of this, no doubt, comes
from the wide variety of job titles given very similar functional
assignments. The most common position titles given by survey
respondents are shown in Table 3. The levels of management
responsibility indicated by the respondents are given in Table 4.
These levels of responsibility will be used in the following sections in
the analysis of perceptions of stress and prestige and decision making
styles.
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TABLE 3
POSITION TITLES

Tide
President/Vice President

Carrier
13%

Director of
Physical Distribution
Terminal Manager

Shipper
2%

Other
25%

13%
16%

Traffic Manager

53%

Other Middle Managers

8%

Sales Manager

15%

Sales Representative

34%
11%

Transportation Analyst
Other

14%

21%

75%

N

433

394

93

72
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TABLE 4
MANAGEMENT LEVEL

Level

Rail

Motor

Shipper

Other

Strategic

10%

17%

7%

12%

Tactical

58%

42%

73%

58%

Operations

32%

41%

20%

30%

N

50

355

384

789

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Table 5 shows the absolute number and the percentage of the
responding Delta Nu Alpha membership that belong to various other
related professional organizations. The biggest overlap is with the
American Society of Transportation and Logistics. A smaller percent
of 1988 survey hold multiple professional memberships in compari
son to the 1976 survey. This leads to speculation that companies
are probably sponsoring fewer memberships, and many may support
only a single membership.
Table 6 shows the self-indicated management level in relation to
professional organization membership. For example, Table 5
showed that ninety-one survey respondents or approximately ten
percent Delta Nu Alpha members also belong to the American
Society of Transportation and Logistics. Table 6 indicates that of
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these ninety-one dual members, sixteen were at the strategic
management level, sixty were at the tactical level, nine were at the
operations level, and six did not provide their level of management.
Sixty-four percent indicated that membership dues were fully
supported by their employers. Twenty-two percent indicated that
membership dues were only partially supported, and thirteen per
cent stated that their employers provided no support The differ
ences in financial support across level of management responsibility
are shown in Figure 1. As one would expect, the higher the level in
the managerial hierarchy, the greater the company sponsored
support At the strategic level, seventy-seven percent were fully
supported, eighteen percent were partially supported, and only five
percent paid for their own professional activities. At the tactical
level, sixty-seven percent were fully supported, twenty-three percent
were partially supported, and ten percent provided their own
support While at the operations level, fifty-one percent received
full support, twenty-five percent were partially supported, and
twenty-four percent have no company support for professional
memberships.
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TABLE 5
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

Organization

Number

Percent

American Society of Transportation
and Logistics

91

10%

Council of Logistics Management

78

8%

NIT League

66

7%

Association of Transportation Practioners

51

5%

Transportation/Public Utilities Croup - AEA

29

3%

Purchasing Management Association

18

2%

American Production and Inventory
Control Society

17

2%

Transportation Research Forum

7

1%

Transportation Research Board

7

1%
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TABLE 6
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS BY MANAGERIAL LEVEL

Organization

Total
Number

Strategic

Tactical

Operations

Not
Stated

American Society
of Transportation
and Logistics

91

16

60

9

6

Council of
Logistics
Management

78

18

49

8

3

NIT League

66

18

41

6

1

Association of
Transportation
Practitioners

51

14

32

2

3

Transportation/
Public Utilities-AEA

29

7

13

9

0

Purchasing
Management
Association

18

3

13

2

0

American Production
and Inventory
Control Society
17

3

12

2

0

Transportation
Research Forum

7

1

3

1

2

Transportation
Research Board

7

0

5

1

1
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FIGURE 1
COMPANY PAYS MEMBERSHIP DUES

PERCENT

None
Partial

None

STRATEGIC

TACTICAL

OPERATIONS

Salary Levels
Comparative salary levels by position title and in total for carriers
and shippers are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. Table 9 shows the
salary distribution by level of management. Fifty-two percent of the
respondents at the operations level reported salaries between
$30,000 and $50,000. At the tactical level, forty percent reported
salaries between $40,000 and $60,000. The greatest variance in
salaries was at the strategic level, where thirteen percent had salaries
of $100,000 or more, but thirty-eight reported levels from $40,000
to $60,000.

TABLE 7
CARRIER SALARY LEVELS BY MAJOR JOB TITLE

Salary Level

President/
V. President

Terminal
Manager

Operations
Manager

Sales
Manager

Sales
Rep.

20000-29999

3%

16%

41%

7%

12%

30000-39999

13%

31%

32%

29%

48%

40000-49999

16%

20%

15%

23%

28%

50000-59999

22%

20%

3%

25%

9%

60000-69999

9%

11%

6%

9%

2%

70000-79999

15%

2%

3%

2%

1%

80000-89999

3%

90000-99999

6%

100000-UP

13%
68

N
78

5%
64

34

56

128
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TABLE 8
SHIPPER SALARY LEVELS BY MAJOR JOB TITLE

Salary Level

President/
V. President

Director of
Physical Distribution

Traffic
Manager

Transportation
Analyst

20000-29999

0%

4%

22%

45%

30000-39999

11%

4%

39%

33%

40000-49999

11%

32%

26%

17%

50000-59999

11%

28%

6%

5%

60000-69999

33%

19%

4%

70000-79999

11%

6%

2%

80000-89999

11%

2%

1%

90000-99999

11%
4%

100000-UP
N

9

47

189

42

Delta Nu Alpha demographics show a mature, experienced,
welleducated work force with upward tending salaries. The salary
increases appear to exceed inflation and cost of living increases,
pointing to the growing status of transportation and distribution
professionals.
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TABLE 9
SALARY LEVELS BY MANAGEMENT LEVEL

Salary Level

Strategic

20000-29999

6%

13%

37%

30000-39999

11%

37%

33%

40000-49999

19%

25%

19%

50000-59999

19%

14%

8%

60000-69999

15%

6%

2%

70000-79999

11%

2%

1%

80000-89999

3%

1%

90000-99999

3%

1%

100000-UP

13%

1%

N

128

432

80

Tactical

Operations

243
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Status and Stress
Agreement concerning whether the deregulation movement has
improved the status and role of a career in transportation and
distribution management is summarized in Figure 2. Rail carriers
expressed agreement with improved status. Also a strong majority of
shippers agreed that deregulation had improved their status. The
perception of change in status increased with managerial responsi
bilities for shippers. However, the perception of change in status
was markedly different for motor carriers. Nearly, half of the motor
carriers disagreed that deregulation had improved their status. In
addition, motor carrier managers at the strategic and tactical man
agement levels indicates less improvement in status than those at the
operations level.
The nature of the economy, not deregulation, affects movement
of the total amount freight But the percentage of available freight
that a particular type of carrier receives is highly influenced by
deregulation. Rail carriers have shown impressive profit gains under
deregulation, and this enhanced economic performance has likely
resulted in both increased status and stress. Whereas, the motor
carrier industry has had mixed financial results. Early under deregu
lation, the industry suffered from the economic downturn, and the
large number of new carriers permitted in the changed environment.
This resulted in excess capacity and lead to wide spread discounting.
While this excess capacity has partially been reduced and profitabil
ity has been resorted to some degree, the responding motor carriers
still indicate little support for deregulation.
Shippers in the 1976 survey did not express support for deregu
lation, which implied the perception their status and role would not
be improved under deregulation. Now, in 1988, over fifty-five
percent of the shippers believe that their status has improved as a
result of deregulation. One plausible explanation for this change is
that traffic and distribution functions are still treated as expense
centers, despite the conceptual arguments to convert to profit
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FIGURE 2
AGREEMENT THAT STATUS HAS BEEN
IMPROVED DUE TO DEREGULATION
PERCENT
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FIGURE 3
AGREEMENT THAT THE STRESS LEVEL
INCREASED DUE TO DEREGULATION
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" J Strategic

centers. The new pricing flexibility has allowed departments to
move more freight through their systems at a lower unit cost, thus
showing a very good expense performance.
All levels of management of motor and rail carriers indicated
increased stress as shown in Figure 3. Overall, eighty-four percent of
motor carriers and eighty-eight percent of the rail carriers agreed
that deregulation has resulted in more stress. Shippers at the
operations and tactical levels also considered the deregulated
environment more stressful. However, less than half of the shippers
at the strategic level viewed deregulation more stressful.

Organizational Issues
The survey made inquiry about preferences for decentralized
carrier sales-marketing functions, centralized shipper trafficdistribution functions, and national accounts selling. For many years, the
major carriers grew in size and moved from a centralized owneroperator orientation to a more decentralized management style.
The implementation of this movement toward decentralized salesmarketing was often accomplished by a form of local territory or
product management. Figure 4 shows that fifty-seven percent of all
rail carriers preferred a decentralized sales-marketing function. It
will be noted from Figure 4, that no rail managers at the strategic
level preferred a decentralized sales-marketing function. However,
this is a weak inference to all rail managers at the strategic level, in
that this result is based on only five respondents. Overall, neither
the motor carriers nor the shippers strongly supported sales-market
ing decentralization. This implies that shippers want to deal with
carriers at a higher managerial level. There was not much difference
in shipper response by managerial level. However, motor carrier
managers at the strategic level indicated much less support than
those at the tactical and operations levels.
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FIGURE 4
AGREEMENT THAT DECENTRALIZED CARRIER SALES OR
MARKETING FUNCTION IS PREFERRED TO A CENTRALIZED FUNCTION
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Before the advent of the physical distribution concept, the
distribution functions of traffic, inventory, and warehousing were
scattered and decentralized, which resulted in the local carrier sales
representative calling on the local traffic manager. But the new
distribution concept called for the grouping of the distribution
activity centers, and a centralization of responsibility control at either
corporate headquarters or at a major distribution center. Rarely do
textbooks or journal publications emphasize the potential benefits of
distribution and customer service decentralization. The reason for
this could lie in the many years spent in attempting to gain upper
management's attention, while developing some form of control of
the expenditures made to move products from the source of raw
materials to the industrial user or ultimate consumer. Figure 5 shows
that shippers strongly supported a centralized traffic-distribution
function, with both rail and motor carriers being less supportive.
Shippers now tend to use significantly fewer carriers, and as a
result, prefer to deal at a higher level in the carrier hierarchy. The
organization charts of many carriers show that many have responded
to this dilemma by establishing national account selling. While even
the causal observer can see wide spread use of national account
selling in this industry, Figure 6 shows that only a minority of both
motor and rail carriers support this organizational form. Further,
only approximately one-third of the shippers preferred national
account selling.
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FIGURE 5
AGREEMENT THAT CENTRALIZED SHIPPER TRAFFIC OR DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION IS PREFERRED TO A DECENTRALIZED FUNCTION
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FIGURE 6
AGREEMENT THAT BETTER SERVICE IS
PROVIDFD BY NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SELLING
PERCENT
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Decision-Making Style
Table 10 displays profiles of decision-making style preferences.
The four decision-making style categories were labeled as "suppor
tive", "aggressive", "creative", and "cautious". The most frequent
style was the "supportive" style which described thirty-one percent
of the respondents. The profile of the "supportive" style manager
includes "being best in my field" as the most common primary work
objective, tending to "look for new ideas" in the job, preferring
either a "creative approach" or "careful analysis" to problem
solving, avoiding "conflict", and being good at "interacting with
others".
The "aggressive" style applied to twenty-seven percent of the
respondents. The profile of the "aggressive" style manager includes
"status or recognition" as the most frequent primary work objective,
seeking the "best solutions" in the job, using "careful analysis" in
problem solving, avoiding "long debates", and being good at
"solving problems". The largest percentage of females were classi
fied as having an "aggressive" decision-making style.
The "creative" style also described twenty-seven percent of the
respondents. The profile of the "creative" style manager includes
"being the best in my field" as the most frequent primary job objec
tive, looking for "new ideas" in the job, adopting a "creative
approach" to problem solving, avoiding "incomplete work", and
being good at both "solving problems" and "seeing possibilities".
The "creative" style had the smallest percentage of respondents at
the operations level and the largest percentage at the tactical level
within a given category.
The "cautious" style had the least number of respondents at
fifteen percent. The profile of the "cautious" style manager includes
"being the best in my field" as the most common primary job
objective. However, it should be noted that thirty-five percent of
those in this category stated that "security" was the prime objective.

Volume 2, Number I

89

TABLE 10
DECISION-MAKING STYLE
"Supportive''

"Aggressive"

"Creative"

Primary Objective:
Be the best
Status
Security

50%
28%
22%

37%
47%
16%

54%
30%
16%

54%
11%
35%

Look for in my job:
New ideas
Best solutions
Good environment
Practical results

41%
34%
15%
10%

11%
48%
10%
31%

55%
31%
5%
9%

6%
43%
14%
37%

Problem solving:
Creative approach
Careful analysis
Feelings
Proven approach

40%
39%
13%
8%

12%
51%
12%
25%

49%
40%
5%
6%

7%
54%
14%
25%

Like to avoid:
Conflict
Incomplete work
Long debates
Using numbers

52%
25%
17%
6%

28%
31%
37%
4%

9%
48%
33%
10%

56%
25%
10%
9%

I am good at:
Interacting
Solving problems
Seeing possibilities
Dates and facts

60%
20%
13%
7%

28%
36%
15%
21%

9%
42%
37%
12%

34%
28%
17%
21%

Management level:
Strategic
Tactical
Operations

16%
54%
30%

18%
50%
32%

17%
61%
21%

11%
49%
40%

Sex:
Female
Male

27%
73%

30%
70%

20%
80%

20%
80%

Indicator

"Cautious"

Forty-three percent look for "best solutions" in their job, while
thirty-seven percent look for "practical results". The approach to
problem solving is "careful analysis", "conflict" is avoided, and are
good at "interacting with others" and "solving problems". This
"cautious" style had the largest percentage at the operations level
within a category.

SUMMARY
The Delta Nu Alpha membership is predominantly male, with
nearly an equal split between shipper and carriers. Compared to the
1976 survey, the number of rail carriers has declined, the number of
motor carriers has increased, and the percentage to shippers has
remained approximately the same. The most significant demo
graphic change is the growth of the female membership. It appears
that Delta Nu Alpha has capitalized on the growing number of
women employed in transportation and distribution. The member
ship has a higher education level than twelve years ago, and is
younger. In total, Delta Nu Alpha demographics show a mature,
experienced, and increasingly well-educated work force with
upward trend in salaries.
The present Delta Nu Alpha membership does not have a large
overlap of memberships with other professional organizations. The
largest cross-membership is with the American Society of Transporta
tion and Logistics. Two-thirds of Delta Nu Alpha members are fully
supported by their employers for membership dues, with higher
level managers receiving substantially more financial support than
those at the tactical and operations levels.
Rail carriers and shippers consider the deregulation movement
to have improved their career status. Motor carriers did not agree.
All three groups were in general agreement that deregulation has sig
nificantly increased job stress, especially at the operations level of
management.
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Rail carriers indicated a preference for a decentralized salesmarketing function, but the motor carriers and the shippers did not
Shippers preferred a centralized traffic-distribution function, while
carriers gave much less support to this issue. Although national
account selling is widely used in the industry, preference for this type
of selling organization was weak from both carriers and shippers.
Four categories of decision style were identified and profiled.
These profiles reflect differences in job objectives, what is looked for
in a job, the preferred approach to problem solving, what is to be
avoided, and what managers feel they are good at Different styles
are related to managerial level, and to a lesser extent, sex.
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Constantin, "Delta Nu Alpha Membership Profile," The Alphian,
Volume 30, Number 7 (November, 1977), pp. 24-25.
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AN EVALUATION OF MOTOR CARRIER SALES REPRESENTATIVES:
THE PERSPECTIVE OF CARRIER SALES MANGERS
by
Peter M. Lynagh, University of Baltimore,
Paul R. Murphy, John Carroll University and
Richard F. Poist, University of Maryland

INTRODUCTION
The growing body of literature on services marketing increas
ingly recognizes the crucial role played by salespeople in the
marketing of services. For example, early writings pointed out that
salespeople could be helpful in reducing customer anxiety associ
ated with the purchasing of services, which tend to be intangible in
nature.1 More recent work suggests that service firms utilize sales
representatives to communicate customer service policies to their
customers.2
However, it appears as if motor carriers have been slow to
recognize the importance of a well-managed sales force. For
instance, a leading distribution executive has asserted that a profes
sional and knowledgeable motor carrier sales force can lead to in
creased market shares for individual motor carriers in part by
attracting business from competing firms.3 In addition, an annual
survey conducted by Distribution Magazine, which asks users of
trucking services to rate individual carriers along the dimensions of
service, price, convenience and sales, has consistently found motor
carriers to be ranked lowest on the sales component4
In many instances, the task of improving sales force performance
falls to sales managers. While motor carrier sales managers have a
number of responsibilities, certainly some of the most important
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involve the recruitment, selection and training of sales personnel.
Poor recruitment and selection, along with inadequate training,
increase the likelihood of sales force turnover; the out-of-pocket
costs of such turnover in the motor carrier industry have been
estimated at nearly $40,000 per sales representative.4
5
Moreover, the recruitment, selection and training of new sales
representatives will reflect the sales manager's perception of various
attributes that should be possessed by individual salespeople. If a
sales manager feels that a salesperson should be outgoing, then
selection techniques, such as psychological testing, might be utilized
to learn about the personality of each recruit Similarly, training
programs will be structured to feature the types of knowledge that a
sales manager deems necessary for successful sales force perform
ance.
The purpose of this paper is to learn more about characteristics
associated with successful performance by motor carrier sales
personnel, as perceived by motor carrier sales managers. Specifi
cally, this paper will investigate the following issues:
1.

What are the absolute and relative importance of various
salesperson characteristics in the selling of motor carrier
services?

2.

Are there statistically significant relationships between
responses to these attributes and selected demographic
variables?

3.

Have motor carrier sales mangers altered their perceptions
of desirable sales force characteristics between the
mid-1970s and the late 1980s?

4.

What implications do the findings of this study have for
sales force management in the motor carrier industry?
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METHODOLOGY
Four hundred U.S. motor carriers, randomly selected from a
recent edition of the Official Motor Carrier Directory, were sent a
survey dealing with the importance of selected sales force character
istics. A concerted effort was made to address the survey to the
highest ranking sales executive at individual firms. One hundred
seventy-nine usable returns were received, for a response rate of
44.8%. This response rate was considered high for a mail survey of
this type and indicated an apparent interest in the study topic.
A demographic profile of respondents is presented in Table 1.
The one hundred and seventy-nine responding companies represent
a variety of size categories; 53% have annual revenues of under
$25,000,000, while 19% of the responses came from motor carriers
with annual revenues in excess of $100,000,000. Respondents
appeared to be well-compensated (75% earn at least $40,000 per
year) and fairly well-educated (45% possess at least a four year
college degree). Likewise, survey participants were overwhelmingly
male, with only six of the 1 79 respondents being female. The
remainder of the paper will be devoted to a presentation and discus
sion of other empirical findings.

IMPORTANCE OF SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
One portion of the survey asked sales managers to evaluate the
importance of 26 salesperson characteristics along a five point scale
ranging from 0 = "no importance to" 4 = "maximum importance";
twenty-two of these attributes were drawn from a similar study
conducted in the mid1970s.6 Four characteristics (knowledge of
electronic data interchange (EDI), knowledge of the deregulated
transportation environment, knowledge of intermodal transport
opportunities, and communication skills) were added in this study to
reflect changes in both the transportation industry and overall
business environment since the mid-1970s.
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TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (n = 179)
AGE

20-29
3.9%

40-49
30.7%

30-39
33.0%

60 and over
14.0%

50-59
18.4%

ANNUAL SALARY:

Under
$30,000
7.0%

$30,000$39,999
17.4%

$40,000$49,999
15.7%

$50,000$59,999
20.9%

$60,000$69,999
9.9%

$70,000$79,999
8.7%

$80,000$99,000
7.6%

$100,000and over
12.8%

Master's
Degree
5.0%

Ph.D

EDUCATION LEVEL:

High
School
17.3%

College
No Degree
37.4%

4 Year College
Degree
36.9%

SEX:

Male
96.6%

n = Number of Respondents

Female
3.4%

Graduate School
No Degree
3.4%

0.0%

TABLE 1 Continued
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS (n = 179)
ANNUAL FIRM REVENUES:

Under
$25,000,000
52.6%

$25,000,000$49,999,999
17.9%

$50,000,000$99,999,999
10.4%

$100,000,000$499,999,999
11.0%

$500,000,000and over
8.1%

YEARS WITH PRESENT EMPLOYER (Company Tenure):

Less than
years
3.4%

1 -5
years
24.0%

6 - 10
years
25.7%

11-15
years
17.3%

16-20
years
9.5%

Over 20
years
20.1%

6-10
years
24.0%

11 -15
years
9.5%

16-20
years
7.8%

Over 20
years
10.1%

YEARS IN PRESENT JOB (Job Tenure):

Less than
years
4.5%

n = Number of Respondents

1 -5
years
44.1%

The results for the twenty-six characteristics, presented in Table
2, show that the most important attribute is ethical conduct by the
salesperson. Ethical behavior, such as fairness and honesty, is also
important to shippers. A recent study conducted by Traffic Manage
ment found that users value motor carrier honesty above all other
traits.7
This emphasis on ethical behavior is an interesting finding, given
the questionable tactics that have been employed by some carriers
and their salespeople in the past, most notably with respect to the
undercharge issue.8 In addition, false or misleading presentations by
carrier sales personnel appear to be a common complaint in the
less-than-truckload (LTL) segment of the motor carrier industry.9 The
fact that 75% of this study's respondents feel that ethical sales force
conduct is of maximum importance, is a clear indication that most
truckers want harmonious relationships with their users.
Moreover, the commitment of sales managers to ethical conduct
by their sales personnel is seen in the response to gratuities (or gifts)
offered by salespeople. This attribute is the .lowest ranked of the 26
characteristics; nearly 60% of the respondents indicate that gratuities
are of no importance or of slight importance for effective sales
performance. These gratuities, which can take many forms, such as
meals and entertainment, may be viewed as an attempt to "buy"
clients. Although this trait is the least importance of those investi
gated, it is interesting to note that roughly 10% of the respondents
feel that gratuities are of great or maximum importance for success
ful performance by motor carrier sales representatives.
The survey results also suggest that a salesperson's promptness
in dealing with customers is the second most important characteris
tic, with nearly two-thirds of the respondents assigning this trait to
the "maximum importance" category. One explanation for this
finding is that sales managers have recognized the importance of
customer service in a deregulated environment, and that in service
industries (such as trucking) customer service arises from frequent
contact between the customer and the supplier.10
700
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TABLE 2
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SALES FORCE CHARACTERISTICS (n = 179)
Characteristic

Ethical conduct by salesperson
Promptness in overall dealings
with customers
Knowledge of carrier's operating
schedules
Self-confidence
Knowledge of carrier's route
structure
Communication skills
Knowledge of carrier's equipment
Neat appearance
Knowledge of customer's
logistics system
Willingness to arrange expedited
service
Knowledge of carrier's rates
Information feedback provided
by salesperson
Friendly personality
Knowledge of customer's product

Of Great
Importance

Of Maximum
Importance

Mean Score3
Importance

22.9%

76.0%c

3.749b

1.7%

31.8%

66.5%

3.648

0.6%
0.6%

6.7%
5.6%

34.6%
39.3%

58.1%
54.5%

3.503
3.478

0.0%
0.6%
0.0%
0.0%

1.5%
0.0%
1.1%
0.0%

6.7%
5.0%
11.2%
6.7%

44.1%
51.4%
40.8%
54.2%

47.5%
43.0%
46.9%
39.1%

3.409
3.363
3.335
3.324

0.0%

0.6%

10.1%

48.0%

41.3%

3.302

0.6%
0.0%

1.7%
0.0%

11.2%
9.5%

41.8%
54.2%

44.7%
36.3%

3.285
3.268

0.6%
0.0%
0.0%

1.1%
0.0%
1.1%

10.6%
15.6%
20.7%

50.3%
49.2%
47.5%

37.4%
35.2%
30.7%

3.229
3.196
3.078

Of No
Importance

Of Slight
Importance

Of Moderate
Importance

0.0%

0.0%

1.15%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

TABLE 2 Continued
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SALES FORCE CHARACTERISTICS (n = 179)
Characteristic

Willingness to discuss rate
change proposals
Knowledge of carrier's competitors
Knowledge of the deregulated
transportation enviornment
Claims assistance
Ability to influence loss and damage
Knowledge of overall
transportation industry
Knowledge of interline connections
Knowledge of electronic data
interchange
Education level achieved
Knowledge of intermodal
transport opportunities
Attendance at professional meetings
Gratuities offered by the
salesperson

Of No
Importance

Of Slight
Importance

Of Moderate
Importance

Of Great
Importance

0.0%
0.6%

2.8%
3.9%

19.6%
16.2%

51.4%
54.7%

26.3%
24.6%

3.011
2.989

0.6%
0.0%
0.0%

4.5%
5.6%
10.6%

23.5%
39.7%
34.6%

44.7%
44.7%
41.3%

26.8%
10.0%
13.4%

2.927
2.592
2.575

0.6%
9.0%

5.1%
9.0%

42.0%
34.3%

44.4%
28.7%

7.9%
19.0%

2.539
2.399

1.1%
5.0%

12.3%
6.7%

41.9%
58.1%

36.3%
25.7%

8.4%
4.5%

2.385
2.179

3.9%
4.0%

16.3%
26.6%

50.0%
52.5%

24.2%
15.2%

5.6%
1.7%

2.112
1.842

30.9%

28.7%

32.0%

6.2%

2.2%

1.202

aMean score based on 0 = no importance and 4 = maximum importance
Characteristics are presented from highest mean score to lowest mean score
'Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding

Of Maximum
Importance

Mean Score3
Importance

The information in Table 2 further indicates that motor carrier
sales managers feel that their sales representatives must be knowl
edgeable about carrier operations, specifically carrier schedules,
routes and equipment For example, knowledge of operating
schedules emerges as the third most important attribute, with nearly
60% of respondents indicating that such knowledge is of maximum
importance for successful sales force performance. One explanation
for this finding is that the motor carrier industry's increasing involve
ment with Just-in-Time inventory systems places high priority on reli
able operating schedules; irregularity can lead to stockouts and/or
production line shutdowns, both of which create customer dissatis
faction.
The increasing motor carrier participation in JIT traffic also
provides an explanation for the importance of sales force knowledge
of carrier equipment (mean score = 3.35). For instance, one
equipment consideration involves the average fleet age for individual
carriers; older equipment is more likely to break down, which
obviously impacts transit time reliability. In addition, a number of
large LTL carriers are adding smaller trailers (e.g., 28 ft trailers
known as "pups") to their fleets, due in part to the smaller, more
frequent orders associated with JIT systems.
Survey participants also suggest that sales representatives should
be knowledgeable as to their carrier's route structure. There are
several explanations for this finding, with one being that since
passage of the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) of 1980 many shippers have
reduced the number of carriers they use; one factor in this decision
is the scope of geographic coverage. Secondly, shippers are actively
seeking to reduce interlining due to the slower transit times and
increased handling of goods. Since shippers generally prefer those
carriers with the ability to provide direct service between particular
city pairs, motor carrier sales representatives need to be cognizant of
their carrier's route structure.
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Furthermore, the information in Table 2 suggests that sales
managers emphasize personal characteristics of sales representatives,
with self-confidence ranked fourth most important, communication
skills as sixth in importance, and neat appearance ranked as the
eighth most important attribute. This might influence the practices
used in the selection of motor carrier sales representatives; for
example, personal interviews would appear to be an excellent
method for evaluating a candidate's self-confidence, appearance and
communication abilities.
Turning to low-ranked attributes, respondents assigned low
importance to a salesperson's attendance at professional meetings
(mean = 1.842) as well as his/her educational history (mean =
2.179). The finding on professional meetings is not surprising in that
many motor carriers have reduced their participation at such events
because of potential antitrust (e.g., collusion with shippers) concerns.
However, the results on education are somewhat unexpected, given
that universities are the recruiting source most likely to be added by
LTL motor carriers over the next several years 11
In addition, two of the least important sales force characteristics,
knowledge of intermodal transport opportunities (ranked 24th out
the 26 traits) and knowledge of electronic data interchange (ranked
22nd) had been included in this study to reflect changes in the
transportation industry and American business since the mid-1970s.
The finding on intermodal knowledge may be a reflection of the fact
that motor carriers are not considered major players in the marketing
of intermodal services and that brokers, railroads and third party
agents are more likely to dominate this phase of intermodal activi
ties.
The relative unimportance of EDI is an unexpected result, given
the increasing use of computers in American business. In fact, the
mean score of 2.385 indicates that survey participants feel that EDI
knowledge is only of moderate importance for successful sales force
performance. One explanation for the low rating and ranking of this
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attribute is that EDI utilization appears to be in the early stages at
many trucking companies.12 As EDI becomes more commonplace in
the motor carrier industry, salesperson knowledge of EDI should
become a more valuable attribute.
A review of the literature as well as consultation with industry
experts indicated that the 26 salesperson characteristics evaluated in
this study could be divided into three distinct categories... Personal,
Service, and Knowledge. Personal characteristics represent those
factors relating to an individual salesperson, their character and
professional background. Service-related characteristics represent
factors which provide service, assistance or tangible value to the
shipper. Finally, Knowledge-related characteristics represent types
of information possessed by salespeople relating to the carrier,
customer and industry. These three groupings, presented in Table 3,
indicate that motor carrier sales managers place heaviest emphasis
on personal attributes, with a median category score of 3.324. In
addition, five of the seven personal attributes have a mean rating of
3.000 ("great importance)" or better. The information in Table 3
also suggests that service (category median = 3.011) and knowledge
(category median = 3.035) characteristics are
of roughly equal importance.
As previously discussed, personal characteristics of sales person
nel may best be addressed in the selection of sales representatives,
whereas service and knowledge attributes might be associated with
sales force training practices. The fact that respondents, on the
whole, favor personal attributes over service and knowledge charac
teristics might suggest that extra attention is devoted to selection
techniques, with a lesser emphasis on training. This subject will be
addressed again in the summary, and implications section of the
paper.
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TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL, SERVICE AND KNOWLEDGE-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS

PERSONAL
Characteristic

Average Rating

Ethical conduct by
salesperson

3.749

Self-confidence

3.478

Communication skill

3.363

Neat appearance

3.324

Friendly personality

3.196

Educational level
Achieved

2.179

Attendance at
professional meetings

KNOWLEDGE

SERVICE

1.842

Average Rating

Average Rating

Characteristic

Promptness in
customer dealings

3.648

Carrier's operating
Schedules

3.503

Arrange expedited
Service

3.285

Carrier's route
Structure

3.408

Information feedback

3.229

Carrier's equipment

3.335

Discuss rate change
proposals

3.001

Customer's
logistics system

3.302

Claims assistance

2.592

Carrier's rates

3.268

Loss and damage

2.575

Customer's products

3.078

Cratuities offered

1.202

Carrier's competitors

2.989

Characteristic

TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL, SERVICE AND KNOWLEDGE-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS

PERSONAL
Characteristic

Category Median:3

SERVICE
Average Rating

3.324

Characteristic

KNOWLEDGE
Average Rating

Characteristic

Average Rating

Deregulated transportation
environment

2.927

Overall transportation
industry

2.539

Interline connections

2.399

Electronic data
interchange

2.385

Intermodal transportation
opportunities

2.112

3.011

3The median represents the middle score in a set of numbers arranged in ascending or descending order.

3.035

DEMOGRAPHIC RELATIONSHIPS
Table 4 provides information on the statistically significant
relationships, at the .05 level or better, that were discovered when
the 26 sales force characteristics were analyzed in terms of six
selected demographic variables. Twenty-eight of the 156 (1 7.95%)
possible relationships emerged as statistically significant. The results
in Table 4 represent the maximum number of significant relation
ships that could be identified within a particular demographic
variable. For example, although only five significant relationships
appear when respondents under 50 years of age are compared to
those over 50, other age dimensions (e.g., under 40 vs. over 40)
generated fewer statistically significant relationships.
The remainder of this section will focus on the significant
differences involving salary and annual revenues because these
variables show the highest number of significant relationships when
compared to the 26 salesperson characteristics. With respect to
salary, t-tests of mean equality for respondents earning less than
$60,000 against those earning $60,000 or more revealed nine
statistically differences, with six of these attributes being more
important to respondents with annual revenues of $60,000 or more.
In fact, all four of the significant knowledge attributes are more
important to the higher-salaried sales managers. Given that salary
often acts as a surrogate for job title and managerial level (i.e., higher
salary associated with more prestigious and senior-level jobs), the
salary t-tests suggest that motor carrier sales managers increase their
opportunities for advancement by developing sales representatives
who deal promptly with customers and who are knowledgeable
about their company's, rates, routes and operating schedules. In
contrast, the lower-salaried sales manager respondents attached
greater importance to claims assistance, attendance at professional
meetings, and gratuities offered by their salespeople.
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TABLE 4
T-TEST OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SALESFORCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES*
SALARY « $60,000; _> $60,000)

REVENUES (<$25,000,000; > $25,000,000)

Claims Assistance (2)

Promptness in Dealing w/Customer (2)

Self-confidence (2)

Knowledge of EDI (1)

Knowledge of Carrier's Route Structure (2)

Knowledge of Carrier's Route Structure (2)

Education Level (2)

Communication Skills (2)

Communication Skills (2)

Knowledge of Intermodal Opport. (2)

Knowledge of Customer's Products (2)

Knowledge of Customer's Logistics Systems (2)

AGE « 50; _> 50)

Gratuities (2)

Knowledge of Carrier's Rates (2)

Claims Assistance (1)

Claims Assistance (1)

Knowledge of EDI (2)

Attendance at Professional Meetings (1)

Attendance at Professional Meetings (1)

Gratuities (1)
Knowledge of Carrier's Operating Schedule (2)

aOnly those relationships statistically significant at the .05 level (or better) are listed in this table.
(1): Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Group 1.
(2): Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Group 2.

TABLE 4 continued
T-TEST OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SALESFORCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES3
EDUCATION (< 4 year college; > 4 yrs)

Knowledge of Carrier's Equipment (1)

COMPANY TENURE(< 10 years > 10 years)

REVENUES (<5 years; > 5 years)

Knowledge of Carrier's Operating Schedule (2)

Ethical Conduct (1)

Friendly Personality (2)

Knowledge of Customer's Logistics Systems (1)

Knowledge of Interline Connection (2)

Knowledge of Carrier's Rates (1)

aOnly those relationships statistically significant at the .05 level (or better) are listed in this table.
(1): Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Croup 1.
(2): Indicates that higher mean score was associated with Croup 2.

The information in Table 4 also indicates that seven of the 26
sales force characteristics have significantly different means when
respondents are classified according to annual firm revenues. Three
of the differences involve personal traits, one involves service
attributes, and three are concerned with knowledge characteristics.
Moreover, in all but two cases, (i.e., claims assistance, and atten
dance at professional meetings), larger firms indicate that the
particular attribute is of more importance than do smaller compa
nies.
For instance, larger carriers (mean = 2.683) place much heavier
emphasis on a salesperson's EDI knowledge than do smaller carriers
(mean = 2.143), which is in line with the fact that the so-called "Big
Three" LTL carriers-Yellow Freight, Roadway, Consolidated Freightways—have been industry leaders in EDI implementation.13 It is also
noteworthy that larger carriers place more importance on certain
personal attributes, such as self-confidence and communication
skills. This may be an indication that the larger motor carriers have
better developed sales force selection programs, because as previ
ously mentioned, personal attributes can be somewhat controlled
through selection practices.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As mentioned earlier, twenty-two of the characteristics in this
study were also analyzed in a similar project conducted in the mid1970s; this section discusses the results that emerge from a compari
son of these 22, traits. While the sampling procedure was identical,
the individual respondents and the carriers they represented did vary
between the two studies. A major rationale for this comparison is
that the MCA of 1980 has been acknowledged as causing profound
changes in the trucking industry. The literature points out that major
organizational change, such as deregulation, creates corporate
upheaval. As a result, firms can be expected to adjust to change,
because failure to do so will increase the length of organizational

,
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uncertainty and instability.14 For example, recent research has
suggested that those motor carriers which have been slow to adapt
their sales force management practices to meet the new, competitive
environment are characterized by less productive sales forces.15
A comparison of the 1975 and current studies, presented in
Table 5, indicates minor differences in both the absolute and relative
importance of the 22 characteristics. With respect to absolute
results, the overall mean score for the 1975 study (2.952) differs
from that of the current study (2.961) by less than .01. In addition,
the mean scores for several attributes are nearly identical in the two
studies. For example, the mean rating for information provided by a
salesperson in the current study, 3.229, is but .008 lower than the
average score for this trait in 1975. Similarly, the differences in
mean ratings for promptness in dealing with customers is only .009.
Because only summary results exist for the 1975 study, statistical
tests for mean differences could not be performed between the two
studies.
Analysis of the relative importance of the 22 characteristics also
reveals a high degree of similarity between the two studies. As
pointed out in Table 5, the Spearman correlation between the 1975
rankings and current rankings generated a coefficient of .898, which
is statistically significant at the .001 level and indicative of minimal
ranking differences between the two studies. In fact, eight of the 22
attributes have the same rankings in both 1975 and at present;
ethical behavior is most important in both studies, while gratuities
are least important
Nevertheless, several of the characteristics exhibit notable rating
and ranking differences, with the most prominent involving pricing
issues. In the 1975 study, a salesperson's willingness to discuss rate
change proposals had an average score of 2.115 and was ranked
twentieth in importance. This attribute's mean rating in the present
study was 3.011 (an increase of .896) and was ranked 14th (an
increase of six positions). In a similar vein, a salesperson's knowl-
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF 1975 AND CURRENT STUDIES3
Salesperson
Characteristic

1975b
Current
Mean (Rank) Mean (Rank)

Neat appearance

3.305 (7)

3.324 (7)

Knowledge of carrier's equipment

3.321 (6)

3.335 (6)

Friendly personality

3.197 (12)

Knowledge of carrier's operating schedules

3.237 (11)
3.603 (3)

Attendance at professional meetings

1.939 (21)

1.842 (21)

Knowledge of customer's logistics system

3.206 (12)

3.302 (8)

Education level achieved

2.351 (19)

2.179 (20)

Willingness to discuss rate change proposals

2.115 (20)

3.011 (14)

Ability to influence loss and damage

2.382 (18)

2.575 (17)

Willingness to arrange expedited service

3.450 (5)

3.285 (9)

Knowledge of carrier's competitors

3.168 (13)

2.989 (15)

Knowledge of customer's products

3.252 (9)

3.078 (13)

Gratuities offered by the salesperson

3.503 (3)

1.344 (22)

1.202 (22)

Knowledge of overall transportation industry

2.626 (16)

2.539 (18)

Ethical conduct by salesperson
Self-confidence

3.771 (1)
3.565 (4)

3.749 (D
3.478 (4)
3.648 (2)

Promptness in overall dealings with customer

3.656 (2)

Claims assistance

2.771 (15)

2.592 (16)

Information feedback provided by salesperson

3.237 (10)

Knowledge of carrier's rates

2.527 (17)

3.229 (11)
3.268 (10)

Knowledge of carrier's route structures

3.298 (8)

3.408 (5)

Knowledge of interline connection

2.809 (14)

2.399 (19)

OVERALL MEAN

2.952

2.961

involving characteristic used in both studies.
bPoist, Richard and Peter Lynagh, The Motor Carrier Salesman,
(Washington, D.C.: American Trucking Association), 1975.
Spearman coefficient of rank = .898, significant at p< .001.
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edge of rates had a mean of 2.527 in 1975 and was 17th in impor
tance. In the current study the mean rating had risen to 3.268 (an
increase of .741) and was ranked tenth in importance, representing
an improvement of seven positions. These results support previous
assertions that deregulation has caused motor carrier pricing prac
tices to assume higher priority as a carrier selection tool.16
Another characteristic exhibiting marked change between 1975
and at present involves a salesperson's knowledge of interline
connections. Unlike the pricing attributes discussed in the previous
paragraph, both the absolute and relative importance of interline
knowledge has decreased since the mid-1970$. The mean rating for
interline knowledge dropped from 2.809 in 1975 to 2.399 currently,
a decrease of .410; likewise, the 1975 ranking of l4th is five places
higher than today. These findings are due likely to the increased
route freedoms fostered by the MCA, which have made it easier for
carriers to operate over broader geographic areas, thus reducing the
need for interlining.
The preceding paragraphs suggest that both the absolute and
relative importance of many of the 22 attributes common to both
studies remain virtually unchanged, an indication that motor carriers
may have been slow to adapt to the opportunities and challengers of
the contemporary trucking industry. This, in turn, can have impor
tant strategic implications, not the least of which is that tentative
reaction to major change hinders the chances for organizational
growth and survival.17 In this vein, work by Smith and Grimm has
found that railroads pursuing the same strategy prior to and follow
ing deregulation had noticeably inferior performance to those that
changed their strategies in response to the Staggers Act.18
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the study was to identify characteristics associ
ated with successful performance by motor carrier sales representa
tives. Armed with this information, carrier sales executives can
design more effective selling strategies as well as improve recruiting
and training practices.
In terms of designing sales strategies, the study findings should
prove valuable in several ways. First, the results provide insight as to
the types of salesperson characteristics perceived to be most and
least important by a large sample of sales executives. For individual
sales managers and representatives this information should provide a
useful benchmark with which to compare one's own opinions.
Likewise, relatively unexperienced sales managers can benefit from
the opinions of their more experienced peers.
Secondly, the results provide insight as to the distinctive features
of selling strategies traceable to demographic differences of respon
dents. For, example, the result suggest that sales managers of larger
carriers are emphasizing effective salesperson communication skills
as well as knowledge of the customer's logistics system and EDI to
set them apart from smaller carriers in their sales efforts. In contrast,
sales managers from smaller carriers are stressing claims assistance
and sales rep attendance at professional meetings in differentiating
their sales efforts. While space does not permit a more elaborate
discussion, similar distinctions in strategy can be observed with
respect to other demographic variables by referring to Table 4. For
the carrier sales executive who wants to keep abreast of what other
carriers are thinking and doing, such information can prove useful in
gaining and/or maintaining a competitive edge.
Likewise, the study results should prove useful for improving
recruiting and training practices. For example, sales manager
respondents indicate that the most important sales force characteris
tic is ethical behavior, such as honesty and fairness. The importance
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of ethical conduct is further emphasized by the fact that a salesper
son's usage of gratuities emerged as the lowest ranked attribute in
this study.
One ramification of these findings is that sales force training
programs should devote time to learning about ethical behavior,
perhaps through the use of case studies. In addition, motor carrier
sales executives might explore selection techniques, such as psycho
logical testing, that offer indications on the ethical makeup of sales
recruits. It has been suggested also that a strong code of ethics be
adopted to govern shipper-carrier relations.19
Sales manager respondents also point out that motor carrier
salespeople need to be knowledgeable about various aspects of
carrier operations, specifically with respect to equipment, route
structure and operating schedules. At a minimum, these findings
suggest increased training content devoted to operations informa
tion. In addition, these findings illustrated the interfaces that exist
between the selling and operations functions; as a result, it is
important for sales representatives to be aware of carrier operational
capabilities so that unrealistic service promises are not made to
customers. One way of ensuring this is through a job rotation or
exchange program involving the sales and operations departments.
Likewise so-called "Quality Circles" might be created to discuss
problems of mutual interest and thereby improve communications
among sales and operations personnel.
Moreover, it can be postulated that a major environmental
upheaval, such as the MCA of 1980, should result in changes in sales
force practice. However, one of the key findings of this study is that
the motor carrier industry's perception of desirable sales force
attributes have changed minimally between the mid-1970s and the
present One explanation for this is that deregulation has encour
aged greater emphasis and change regarding pricing and new service
offerings at the expense of personal selling efforts.
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Likewise, during this timespan, sales managers continued to
place heavier emphasis on a sales representative's personal charac
teristics than on either service or knowledge attributes. For example,
such personal attributes as ethical conduct, self-confidence, commu
nication skills, and neat appearance were rated as being of “maxi
mum importance" by 40 percent or more of respondents. As
previously mentioned, this emphasis on personal characteristics
might suggest that greater attention is currently being devoted to the
selection process with regard to sales reps with a lesser attention to
training. This may help to explain the fact that recent research has
indicated that average sales force training in the trucking industry is
noticeably shorter than in many other service industries.20
At the same time, there is strong evidence to suggest that
shippers are dissatisfied with the lack of customer orientation
displayed by motor carrier sales representatives. This was true prior
to deregulation as well as at present21 As previously mentioned in
the introduction to this paper, Distribution's annual shipper survey
consistently finds motor carriers to be weakest on the sales dimen
sion. In the magazine's 1988 survey, it was reported that “Shippers
are nearly unanimous in their panning of carrier sales reps. Many
shippers complain that they never see a sales rep; others say the
ones they see are woefully unfit for the job"22
Other anecdotal evidence also exists. For example, a top
distribution executive at Computerland Corporation was quoted as
saying “...today's carrier representatives need to be more profes
sional and businesslike in their approach... the day of 'Polyester
Harry' with a cigar and a bottle of booze are passe." This executive
also indicated that personal characteristics such as neat appearance
are part of professionalism, but stressed that sales reps need to be
more knowledgeable about rates and pricing and need to do their
homework before visiting customers.23
In essence, it appears that shippers would prefer to deal with
more knowledgeable and professional sales personnel, whereas
motor carriers appear to be emphasizing style (i.e., in the form of
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personal attributes) over substance in their current sales practices.
Consequently, sales force practices in the motor carrier industry
need to be reviewed and perhaps, revised. The successful motor
carrier of the future will be one that thoroughly understand its
shippers' need and preferences and is able to tailor its services and
sales efforts accordingly.
The key to this success is for carriers to modify the "operations
orientation" which has been so prevalent in the past and combine it
with a strong "customer orientation". A number of carriers are
actively striving to achieve such an orientation. For example, Yellow
Freight has developed a Quality Assurance Program that stresses the
following principles: (1) Teamwork, (2) Doing the basics right the
first time, (3) Productivity improvement, (4) Customer satisfaction, (5)
Improved communication, (6) Continuous training and education,
and (7) Searching for continuous improvements for the good of the
carrier and its customers24
Regarding the importance of customer satisfaction, Craig Cina,
Director of Market Planning for Yellow states "Now, more than ever
before, it's essential that we listen to our customers, understand
what they're saying as it applies to serving them better, and then
respond to what they tell us."25 To facilitate these efforts, the carrier
is developing a quantitative customer satisfaction measurement and
feedback system to demonstrate their commitment to listening and
improving.
Finally, this study also has implications for shippers or users of
trucking services by providing greater insight into the training and
selection of sales reps as well as identifying sales preferences based
upon demographic variables. Moreover, if their needs are to be
met, shippers must communicate their wants and expectations
regarding carrier salespeople. In other words, shippers should play
an active role in helping carriers assess and define what is lacking in
current sales relations.
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In turn, carriers must make a commitment to listen and strive to
address deficiencies if they are to be truly dedicated to a “customer
orientation". Rather than adversaries working at cross purposes,
shippers and carriers should view themselves as partners or allies
striving for a mutual goal. It is this so-called “Win-Win" scenario in
which both parties benefit that is required for success in today's
highly competitive and rapidly changing transportation environment
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BOOK REVIEWS

CONTEMPORARY TRANSPORTATION: Donald F. Wood and James
C. Johnson, 3rd ed., New York: Macmillan, 1989.

This text has been vastly revised for the third edition and now
includes some critical chapters that acknowledge the management
problems in transportation in the post-deregulation era. While the
world turned upside down in 1980, or thereabouts, the transporta
tion principles texts did not necessarily do so. To some extent, they
could not. How can one write about "principles of transportation"
when the principles are no longer well established? Granting that
many of the true principles of the discipline remain intact regardless
of the deregulatory climate, much of what filled the pages of basic
transportation books became dated. This new edition of
Contemporary Transportation is one of the first general transporta
tion texts to fully acknowledge the necessary changes.
The introductory section of the text contains a chapter that
should be of particular assistance in building transportation under
graduate majors--"Transportation Employment and Careers,"
Chapter 3. Given the "will it get me a job" orientation of under
graduate business majors, this chapter helps to focus on what
happens to transportation majors when they graduate. The carrier
section of the text contains one chapter on each of the five modes,
plus a chapter on intermodal and auxiliary carriers. It also incorpo
rates Chapter 11, "Pricing, Rates, and Negotiations," a specific area
omitted from some of the major texts currently on the market The
shippers' section has a chapter on inbound logistics, as well as the
traditional physical distribution and traffic management chapters.
The final section, Carrier Management, looks at public sector, private
sector, and international transportation. A new chapter has been
added on the increasingly important area of the emerging or en

,
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trepreneurial carrier or logistician. Each chapter has some mini
cases at the end which help to emphasize some of the points related
to the subject matter in the chapter.
One approach that the authors use in the text seems to be of
increasing importance: computer screens as graphics to support text
material. They show Yellow Freight's ZIP rating system in their
discussion of pricing, rates and negotiations. If any criticism can be
made of this approach, it is that it should be used more and used in
other areas than rates. One reality of the post-deregulation era in
transportation is the increasing use of computers in every aspect of
the business.
While it would be nice to see more material on each of the five
modes of transportation, that is not possible in a principles text that
covers as much material as this one does. The book is well written,
well-researched, and organized in a useful way. It is recommended
for any undergraduate survey course in transportation, or as a
supplement in an introductory graduate course.
Stephen A. LeMay
Mississippi State University
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LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION:
by Paul Stephen Dempsey and William E. Thoms.
(Quorum Boob, 1986). Pp. xi 349. ISBN #0-89930-138-X

It has been over a dozen years since the first signs of economic
deregulation surfaced in the transportation industry. The regulatory
reform movement brought major policy changes to the once static
operating and pricing environments. Even though many segments of
the industry were deregulated, there are still several important
reasons why practitioners as well as students might find an examina
tion of past laws and regulatory practices valuable. First, despite
deregulation, it must be realized there are still major portions of the
transportation legal structure which remain intact More impor
tantly, recent changes in the competitive structure of the transporta
tion industry have focused new attention on the results of deregula
tion. These events may force a policy shift away from the free
market toward some form of economic reregulation of select modal
segments.
It is difficult to resolve current policy problems without a
thorough knowledge of the history of transportation legislation and
regulatory environment The text, Law and Economic Regulation in
Transportation, provides an easy, readable, and practical format to
build this comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and
future transportation policy direction.
The book contains eight chapters examining three separate but
interrelated topics. The general subject matters include: (1) the
history of transportation regulation, (2) a detailed examination of
economic regulation, and (3) select topics in transportation law.
Chapter 1 provides a brief synopsis of the growth of domestic
transportation law. The text does an adequate job of providing a
legislative framework for understanding the economic regulation of
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all modes of transportation. The discussion begins with the public
toll roads of the late 1 700's and traces current regulation up to the
legislation of the early 1980's.
The next three chapters detail the legislation, court cases, and
rules which supply the basis for economic regulation. Chapter 2
covers current and past policies involved with entry, exit, and
adequacy of service for the various modes. This chapter provides
insight into policy decisions related to the competitive structure of
the transportation industry. Chapter 3 is an overview of rate
regulation for all the individual modes. This chapter examines the
rationale for rate regulation and the changes to pricing policy as a
result of deregulation. Chapter 4 examines issues surrounding
antitrust practices and financial regulation of the modes. This
chapter is extremely useful in understanding today's complex
regulatory environment. Currently, there is confusion over the
changing role of rate bureaus, application of antitrust regulations and
the reversal of several recent merger decisions.
The last four chapters cover select subjects of law and economic
regulation in transportation. These include: liability, government
involvement in rail operation, labor legislation, and mass transit.
Chapter 5 explores liability issues in transportation beginning with its
evolution from common law. This topic could be of particular
interest to practitioners since it describes changes in liability caused
by regulatory reform in the rail, motor, and air segments.
Chapter 6 examines the role of the government in the operation
of the nation's domestic rail system. Specifically, the chapter
describes the past and present government involvement with
Amtrak, commuter passenger services, and ConRail.
No text written about transportation law is complete without a
brief survey of labor legislation. Chapter 7 provides a concise
explanation of the legislation utilized in the resolution of transporta
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tion industry labor disputes. Topics include a brief summary of the
pertinent labor laws as well as a discussion of specific labor issues
such as the protection of the transportation employees jobs.
The final chapter includes subjects which are often times not
covered in a text of transportation law and regulation. Chapter 8
provides an overview of the origin and structure of mass transit's
legal environment
Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation can be
effectively utilized as an introductory transportation law text as well
a supplement to advanced transportation policy seminars. The
material has application for students with limited knowledge of
transportation law as well as industry practitioners who require more
specific and detailed information.
Overall, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation
provides a useful, practical, and comprehensive understanding of the
legal and economic regulation in the transportation industry.
Gary S. Wilson
Assistant Professor of Transportation/Logistics
Western Illinois University
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SPECIAL ISSUE
A special issue of the Journal of Transportation Management devoted to Air
Cargo will be published in 1991. This future publication is being made
possible as a result of a grant from Federal Express Corporation. Please
contact the editors or publisher for additional information.

FUTURE EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES
Delta Nu Alpha's 50th Anniversary will be celebrated in Philadelphia on
September 12-15, 1990 at the Fourth Annual Combined Education
Conference co-sponsored with the American Society of Transportation and
Logistics.

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM
The Transportation Research Forum has announced their 32nd Annual
Meeting will be held October 10-12, 1990 in Long Beach, California. For
additional information, please contact the TRF National offices at Suite 905,
1600 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22209.

